THE
# MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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## SIGNS OF THE TIMES

### The Election to the Primacy.

We are glad that the Dean of Canterbury, on the occasion of the election of Dr. Cosmo Lang to the Archbishopric of Canterbury, used the opportunity to call particular attention to the method of election, and pointed out the very real safeguards which that method provides to prevent one being elected whom the representatives of the Church in his diocese regarded as plainly unsuitable for the position. The following passage form Dr. Bell's speech makes this clear:

> I have said that it is important that the powers of the electing body should be understood. And I think that a close attention to the procedure will show to a careful Churchman that they have some substance. I am dealing, be it remembered, with the system of the appointment of Bishops as it exists to-day—not with what might or might not be desirable as an alternative. I do not wish to exaggerate those powers; but it is possible to go to the other extreme and deny them all reality.
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> There are three points to which I would invite attention in this connexion.
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> (1) Apart from any previous communication between the Crown and the authorities of the Church, such as is usual on the vacancy of a see, it is very much to the interest of all concerned that the new Bishop should come into his see with all the consent that the Church, both in the Diocese and the Province, has power to give him in election and confirmation. It may not be very considerable in its scope; and it is well known that if the Chapter refuse to elect the person proposed by the Crown, not only shall they and all their aiders, counsellors, and abettors incur the dangers, pains, and penalties of the Statute of Provisors and Praemunire, but it is open to the King to nominate and present, in spite of the Chapter, by Letters Patent. Yet, as no Chapter would refuse without the general feeling of the Diocese

behind it, the censure which such refusal would involve would be difficult to ignore; and the position of a Bishop, so thrust upon a Diocese, would be so painful and unsatisfactory from every point of view as to be in modern days impracticable.

(2) Further, that election has a genuine force as a legal safeguard, in addition to its moral value, is suggested *inter alia* by two instances of a legislative character.

(*a*) In 1547, 1 Edward VI, Cap. 2, an Act for the Election of Bishops enacted, contrary to the Act of Henry VIII, that in future as election by the Chapter was expensive and dilatory, and was derogatory and prejudicial to the Royal Prerogative, there should be no Congé d'elire and no election; but the King should collate by Letters Patent. This Act, however, was not only repealed by Queen Mary, but its repeal was endorsed by Queen Elizabeth, so reviving and re-establishing the ancient method of election and confirmation: a thing hardly worth doing if it had no meaning.

(*b*) Again, when a Bill was introduced into the House of Commons in 1880 to abolish the election as a mere unedifying formality, it was pointed out by Mr. Gladstone that the existence of the ceremony constituted a moral check on improper appointments.

(3) Lastly, it is perfectly true that no case exists in which a Chapter has refused to elect the person named in the Letter Recommendatory: though it is worthy of remembrance that there has been at least one case of a refusal on the part of an Archbishop of Canterbury to consecrate an unsuitable nominee of the Crown. These safeguards, however, are safeguards to be cherished and respected, and the forms in which they are expressed are to be scrupulously carried out, as protections to the Church in case of need. For I make bold to assert that in the remote contingency of the Crown proposing for Bishop a person in whom, according to the common judgment of the Church, no confidence could be placed, neither the Chapter asked to elect, nor the Bishops requested to confirm, would hesitate to refuse him, whatever the personal consequences to themselves.

I have thought it worth while on so unusual an occasion to make these brief remarks on the general process and purport of an election. And in making them to-day I feel sure that I am in no danger of being misunderstood.

There is no doubt that if the State, represented by the Prime Minister, possesses the power to nominate any canonically qualified person to a vacant bishopric, the Church by the refusal of the Dean and Chapter to elect, and by the refusal of the Primate and the bishops to consecrate, has the power to veto the appointment. And we have no doubt to-day that these two bodies would have sufficient moral courage to exercise this veto if they were convinced in their consciences that the State's nominee was not fitted to be a bishop. Even in what is regarded as the Erastian eighteenth century, Edmund Gibson, Bishop of London, who was practically acting Primate, owing to the mental

collapse of Archbishop Wake, prevented an eminent ecclesiastic of Latitudinarian reputation from being consecrated, although the Government of the day was most desirous that he should be given a Bishopric.

There is no sacred or divinely appointed method for electing bishops. Primitive precedent makes it clear that the bishop was elected by the laity, and not by the clergy. This primitive right of the laity is to-day in England exercised by the Prime Minister, and more judiciously and beneficially exercised than it could be by the *plebs Dei* of the vacant diocese acting directly. No doubt there are many laymen who would desire to exercise their right directly, and there are many clergymen who claim the right to share it with the laity, but those who are not enamoured of party strife and electioneering tactics in connection with the appointment of a bishop, and whose only desire is that the best man shall be appointed as quietly and quickly as possible, cannot but feel extremely thankful for our present methods. Those methods reflect the practical genius of the English nation in the political sphere, and they certainly provide us with a much better bench of bishops than we could get by any other means. This last fact, we believe, is generally conceded, even by those who want to change the method of appointment because they are frightened by the bogie of Erastianism. Our reply to such would be the distich :

> 'For forms of government, let fools contest,
> Whate'er is best administered is best.'

That system of appointing bishops, which gives us the best bishops, is most in harmony with the Divine Will. Any other system of episcopal appointment which, whatever ecclesiastical precedents may be cited for it, gives us inferior bishops, is less Divine, for the Divine test of methods, as of men, is 'By their fruits ye shall know them.'

### The Episcopal Interims-Ethik.

The decision of the majority of the Bishops to authorize the use of the 1928 Prayer Book temporarily, has caused much misgiving to those Churchmen who do not desire the disaster of Disestablishment. At first sight the Episcopal action looks like a defiance of Parliament—the determination by the Bishops to

carry out at all costs their policy for the restoration of liturgical order by concessions to Romanizing, although that policy has been twice rejected by the House of Commons. It is true that some of the Bishops have used provocative and intemperate language, which might suggest that their latest policy is a deliberate defiance of Parliament, and the rejection of the terms of the *Concordat* between Church and State, accepted by the Church authorities when they originated, formulated, and consented to the legislation which created the Church Assembly. Yet we do not think that it is either just or charitable to view their action in this way. We believe that their intentions are neither defiant nor dishonourable. The Bishops are in a great strait. The Ship of the Church is on the rocks. The Episcopal policy of insisting on the reservation of the sacramental elements in such a manner as to admit of their adoration caused the present disaster. It seemed to us at the time, that it would have been much more statesmanlike after its first rejection to have withdrawn the alternative Communion Service, and the new sacramental regulations, and to have sent the revised Prayer Book up to Parliament in that form, and to have issued a public statement that the Bishops, having been deprived of the means for which they had asked to enable them to restore order, could not promise to secure it, although, of course, they would strive to do their best under the circumstances. This policy would have given the Church a revised Prayer Book, for there is not the slightest doubt, in the light of Sir Thomas Inskip's proposal to the Primate, that such a book would have received overwhelming support in the Commons, and it would also have released the Episcopate from a dangerous situation, created by the belief that they had pledged themselves to do, what many who know something of the temper and tactics of our pro-Romanist brethren, believe to be quite beyond the power of the Bishops to accomplish, without the possession of enlarged disciplinary powers for which they have declined to ask Parliament. As Modernists we look to education rather than to legislation to end the Romanizing of our religion. Yet judicious liturgical laws, administered in a reasonable way, are a very important factor in educating a Christian community in the principles and practice of the Christian Religion.

## Dr. Temple and Modernism.

*The Churchman* (of New York), in its issue of November 24th, publishes an interesting interview with the Archbishop-elect of York. Commenting on the recent protest against Modernism by Lord Halifax and his friends at the Cheltenham Church Congress, Dr. Temple said:

> 'This episode raises the whole question of the place of Modernism in the Church. It is clear that in one sense it cannot be avoided, and never has been avoided. The greatest pillar of mediaeval orthodoxy is St. Thomas Aquinas, who was regarded in the early part of his life as most dangerous. The intellectual environment is always changing, and the task of the theologian is to interpret the central Christian experience and conviction in relation to the environment of his own day, so as to make it intelligible. There is always a risk that in doing this he will modify the actual substance of that central experience and conviction; and Traditionalists in every generation are anxious lest this is happening. It is a quite justifiable anxiety. On the other hand, it need not happen. If the Gospel is true, it must be capable of being brought into living relation with all other truth, because there certainly are not various systems of truth existing side by side unrelated to each other; and it is only through the criticism of Modernist efforts by the upholders of tradition that the human mind generally advances to a proper re-adjustment of the central conviction and the new environment. So, as is usual in a contention between good people, both are right, both are fulfilling their own vocation, and both are contributing in their own way to the general advance. Everyone agrees that the Church as a society must exercise some control over what is said by its official spokesmen. No one, for example, would think it appropriate that a clergyman who became an atheist should use his pulpit to give the grounds for atheism. The question where to draw the line cannot be a matter of unalterable principle, but must be a matter of practical statesmanship from day to day; because what is vital to moral authority in the sphere of belief is that all should recognize that those who agree in upholding any belief have freely reached their own conviction, otherwise there is no value in agreement.'

No doubt a line must be drawn, yet it is exceedingly difficult to know where to draw it. Bishop Creighton's epigram exhibits the nature of the difficulty: 'There is the right of the individual to be free, and there is the duty of the institution to be something.' These conflicting claims are not at all easily reconciled in times of mental and moral activity. There are two practical rules that all in authority should be careful to observe.

(1) Give the largest possible measure of freedom to young men in subordinate positions. If freedom of teaching is being used to the detriment of the influence of the Christian Faith, then select the greatest man, the most mature, 'the meetest of

your master's sons,' and take proceedings against him as a heretic, but let the young teachers alone. It is the restriction of freedom among the young, and the winking at the misuse of freedom in the case of the mighty, which is both unjust and injudicious.

(2) Encourage the teacher to criticize himself. When the responsibility in such a case is put on the individual, and he is asked to decide the issue in all sincerity for himself, it will be very seldom found that a man of Christian character will misuse his official position to the detriment of the Christian Faith. In any case all rulers would do well to remember the late Lord Salisbury's maxim: 'Allow for the swing of the pendulum.' What rulers have most to fear are the reactions created by their policies.

Dr. Temple, we are glad to observe, takes a robust view of the present situation and the spirit demanded by it. He is reported as saying:

> 'The great need of our time, as I see it, is that we should try to substitute for the spirit of controversy the spirit of mutual appreciation, recognizing that people are drawn to our One Lord in different ways. This substitution is in fact going steadily on, and the Church of England is a far more united body now that it was twenty years ago. It is, comparatively speaking, an accident that its controversies lately have been of a kind to attract public attention. The public, becoming aware of them often for the first time, thinks we are on the verge of breaking up. But this concentration on public controversy, which passing events have made necessary, is a misfortune because it distracts attention from the Church's real work. In one sense, that work never varies; it is the bringing of men into fellowship with Christ; but the directions in which the implications of this fellowship should be developed may vary from one time to another; and with every such movement there is a danger that the secondary interest will overshadow the primary.'

In these matters we need light without heat, and the spirit which insists on discussing fundamental issues, but with courtesy and a serious effort to understand an opponent's position. In our Church policy we should do better if we dispensed with stunts and sensations, and trusted more to pastoral work, thoughtful preaching, and reverent, beautiful, and simple services.

### 'The New Modernism.'

The Rev. F. R. Barry, the new Vicar of St. Mary's, Oxford, contributed an interesting article to the *Guardian* of November 16th, entitled 'The New Modernism,' in which he makes a tren-

chant attack on the psychology of the Traditionalist in his defensive and offensive efforts on behalf of the Faith. Mr. Barry writes :

> So long as we remain on the defensive we shall always be fighting a losing war driven back from one concession to another; and, as each new piece of knowledge is discovered, people will ask us, 'Where are you now?' Evolution is a case in point: we cannot really deal with it faithfully by maintaining our traditional position modernized by such concessions as it extorts from us, and bringing Adam and Eve into the story with a tale of pre-human ancestry behind them. The evolutionary hypothesis really involves a whole new orientation. But the whole idea of having to make concessions surely implies a totally false approach. The true defence is the point of the sword, the sword of the Spirit which is the Word of God. As Professor Whitehead states somewhere, we do not find scientists anxiously debating whether scientific truth is not endangered because someone has discovered a new star. And, surely, the teaching of the Church can no longer rest on this false attitude. An unhappy illustration of wrong methods is afforded by an agitation in a London deanery last month in which many clergy took the view that belief in our Lord's miraculous birth must be held as a matter of obligation. As if a man could believe anything because he is told it is his duty to do so! I am not discussing this doctrine in itself, nor am I raising here the larger question of what tests it is right to impose on commissioned teachers of the Church. My point is simply that this whole attitude seems to me to rest on a wrong foundation.
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> In fact, the real task of Christian teachers is not so much to defend a position as to offer a positive interpretation of the facts of life in the light of Christ. A new method of apologetic is really necessary in this age. Here—we must say—are the facts of life, as known to us in our experience and through the knowledge of experts: what is the purpose and meaning of these facts? Christianity is offered to us as an interpretation of the Universe. Can you produce one that is more convincing?

This is excellent and has our hearty concurrence. Of course the *crux* arises when one says with Mr. Barry: 'Christianity is offered to us as an interpretation of the Universe.' That demands that the preliminary question should be answered: What do you mean by Christianity? Do you mean the Gospel as preached by Jesus Christ? Or, do you mean the theology of Nicaea and Chalcedon? Or, do you mean the Decrees of the Council of Trent or the Westminster Confession? If the reply be made: I mean by Christianity any one of these, then the conflict begins. Equally if you reply: I mean by Christianity that which is fundamental and common to all of them. In that case you find yourself assailed as one who is offering men 'a reduced Christianity.' So long as we keep to vague generalities, we can escape

criticism, but we cut no ice. The Mugwump in American politics makes a fine art of this method, but the State derives no benefit. In teaching the truth it is necessary to reject error: in presenting spiritual religion the teacher is compelled to utter warnings against superstition: in expounding the Divine Will, human plans and policies which are in opposition to it have to be pilloried. Mr. Worldly Wiseman may evade the issue, but Evangelist cannot. When Mr. Barry presents his 'New Modernism' as a substitute for that Modernism which he describes as 'obsolete Victorian liberalism,' it is impossible while he deals in generalities to know exactly wherein his New Modernism differs from it. To the Victorian Liberals like F. D. Maurice we owe much. It is true that Biblical criticism and historical research have compelled us to pass beyond them in some directions, but it is they who in the face of bitter opposition have helped to render our position tenable. Yet it is not held easily. Scriptural Fundamentalism is only one aspect of the Modernist's conflict. Sacerdotal claims and sacramental superstitions, sub-Christian doctrines and pre-scientific theologies, stand in the serried ranks which oppose him. Romanists, Secularists, Protestant Fundamentalists, extreme Anglo-Catholics and fanatical Unitarians are all engaged at present in attacking the Modernist. It is a significant phenomenon. Each of them sees in Modernism the enemy. We shall hope on other occasions to show why. Meanwhile we may note the fact. It does not quite agree with Mr. Barry's statement that 'we are all Modernists nowadays,' but it does indicate that Modernism is no longer negligible. 'The Menace of Modernism,' the title of a subject recently proposed for discussion at a clerical conference, demands serious attention. When it gets it, Modernism will be nearer its goal.

# THE UNIFORMITY OF NATURE AND THE FREEDOM OF MAN

By the Right Rev. E. W. Barnes, D.D., Sc.D., F.R.S.,
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THE seventeenth century resembled the twentieth in that each began with a splendid succession of scientific discoveries. The natural result of an increase in knowledge is a change in men's outlook, and it is usually followed by attempts to create new philosophic systems. In the seventeenth century Descartes used the new knowledge of his era as the basis of a philosophic system which for long was of great influence. In essence his system was rigidly mechanical, and he applied it not only to the inorganic world but also to the world of life. Thus he regarded animals at automata: he believed that all their actions were the consequences of rigid mechanism. To humanity he allowed the possession of an immaterial soul. Man thus differed decisively from the animals and escaped that subjection to the rule of law by which they were bound. Of course, much in Descartes' system now seems to us fantastic. In particular, he imagined that the soul of man was especially associated with the pineal gland. This structure in the brain is, as physiologists are now agreed, a vestigial eye: Descartes erroneously thought that it was not to be found in animals. In a popular and debased form Descartes' system held its own until the nineteenth century: most intelligent people believed in a reign of natural law from control by which man was partially exempt because he possessed a soul with which the animals had not been endowed. Then came the transformation of ideas which we owe to Darwin. Whatever criticisms may be advanced against the particular mechanism of evolution for which he argued, Darwin conclusively demonstrated, in Professor Arthur Thomson's words, 'man's similarity with the rest of creation, his affiliation to a mammalian stock.' The sharp contrast between man and the higher vertebrates which Descartes had postulated thus proved untenable. There are undoubtedly traces, and more than traces, of rational thought even in the less developed vertebrates.

Different though man undoubtedly is from the animals from which he has been derived, this difference expresses itself through his spiritual and moral faculties; it cannot be so stressed as to deny that animals possess mind. If they have no free-will, neither has man. If man has free-will, so have they. The change in popular thought among us during the last two generations shows a full realization of such truth. Hence it has become urgently necessary that Christian philosophers should examine the implications of man's kinship with lower forms of life, more especially in connection with such problems as the freedom of the will and personal immortality.

It has been justly said that the intelligence of humanity is a defective instrument for creating a philosophy of the universe, because it has presumably developed in special directions as a consequence of natural selection. Evidently any hominoid or primitive man who failed to recognize the existence in nature of those uniformities which we commonly term natural law was likely to have a short life. One does not need to formulate the law of gravitation to recognize the probable result of a fall from the bough of a tree. Moreover, with the development of civilization the importance of the sequences of nature becomes greater rather than less. An agricultural community which refuses to believe that harvest follows seed-time is likely to starve. Thus, owing to our ancestral history there is a natural tendency in humanity to attach full, if not exaggerated, importance to the so-called laws of nature. Perhaps for this reason primitive peoples seem usually to have believed that the exceptional man, the divinely inspired leader, could set aside natural laws. This belief in special powers endured so long as the sequences of phenomena were ill understood. It is only in quite modern times that disbelief in the possession of such abnormal powers over nature has become general.

Such disbelief towards the close of the nineteenth century was associated, in the teaching of a group of scientific men of which Huxley was the outstanding representative, with the doctrine that human free-will was illusory. The belief arose (it was expounded with great sincerity and ability) that, given sufficient knowledge of precedent physical circumstances, the actions of man could be predicted as certainly as the positions

of the planets. It was admitted that such precedent knowledge as was necessary for this kind of prediction was unobtainable, and further, that it must include the disposition of the atoms of the brain. But none the less, it was confidently assumed that scientific discovery would increasingly reveal new sequences in nature, and that ultimately the purely physical causes of human action would become clear.

Herbert Spencer, in his *Autobiography*, recorded one aspect of the Victorian outlook with naïve confidence.

> 'It seems to me,' he says, 'as though I knew by intuition the necessity of equivalence between cause and effect—perceived without teaching the impossibility of an effect without a cause appropriate to it, and the certainty that an effect, relevant in kind and quantity to a cause, must in any case be produced.'

He thus came to regard as impossible everything conceived as contrary to the causality of nature.

In connection with such a standpoint it is of fundamental importance to analyse the notion of cause. Only after reflection does one begin to discover how difficult it is to define cause adequately. Our own experience naturally makes us ascribe *efficient* causation to natural phenomena. When we do things we are conscious of a feeling of endeavour, and we naturally ascribe to the sequences of nature some like quality which *binds* the effect to the cause. David Hume, however, made it clear in the eighteenth century that this conception of efficient causation is neither necessary nor useful in natural science. So far as the principle of causation is retained in science, it must be as a working hypothesis by which we assume that we can predict the occurrence of certain events when some definite grouping of antecedent events is known. We must not, therefore, import the idea of logical necessity into what we describe as cause and effect in nature. Natural science does not explain the intrinsic nature of the sequences which it describes : it tells us how things happen, but not in the ultimate resort why they happen. Furthermore, such sequences of phenomena by their very nature have in themselves nothing purposive or directed towards an end. We cannot legitimately conclude from a knowledge of any of them that the succession of cause and effect is part of a general plan with a definite end in view. Now I personally find plain evidence of purpose in that prolonged development of life upon

the earth which has culminated in the creation of man; I do not therefore think that we can expect to discover from the mechanisms of natural science that knowledge of things as they really are which some men of science assert that we can thus obtain.

It is well known that in natural science we do not get the notion of causation unless there is a certain contingency attaching to the so-called cause of an event. For instance, day regularly follows night, but we cannot therefore say that night is the cause of day, or *vice versa.* Helmholtz, who speculated deeply on these matters, affirmed that the principle of causality was none other than the hypothesis that all the phenomena of nature are ordered according to law. But Helmholtz' statement is not wholly satisfactory. In the notion of causality, as commonly accepted, a knowledge of the past is sufficient to determine the governing law; yet it is possible to frame laws of behaviour which cannot always be determined without knowledge of future behaviour. Thus there are purely mechanical sequences which resemble those commonly regarded as belonging exclusively to the sphere of mental action. Let me give an illustration of this little known fact. It is possible to imagine an Archbishop who has pursued a steady course of orthodoxy suddenly for a month lapsing into the Monophysite heresy, and then at the end of the month recapturing his orthodoxy and retaining it unsullied for the rest of his life. A complete analogy to such conduct can be exhibited as a deterministic system. Hobson has explained in his Gifford Lectures on *The Domain of Natural Science* that it is possible to give a single formula by which the position of a particle can at any time be calculated, though that particle in the middle, as it were, of uniform motion in a straight line suddenly describes a semi-circle (it is to be understood that the particle ends its course with its initial uniform motion in the same straight line as that in which it began). Obviously, between the action of the particle and the action of the imaginary Archbishop there is complete correspondence; and it would have been impossible to calculate the aberration of either from a knowledge of his or its course before such aberration began.

The limited character of the sequences which constitute what is commonly called the uniformity of nature should be carefully observed. In obtaining them we usually disregard all that is

individual in the things with which we deal. Our so-called laws are deduced by the operations of accurate measurement; they therefore only apply to things of which we have *quantitative* knowledge. We perforce ignore *qualities* which are not amenable to such measurement. It may be said with some truth that there are certain qualities whose physical manifestations we can measure; and that we can therefore bring these qualities within the realm of natural law. But none the less our knowledge is ultimately a knowledge of certain pointer-readings which we can observe; and we must insist that it leaves us absolutely ignorant of the essential nature of the things which we measure. Thus, as Eddington has well said, 'there is nothing to prevent the assemblage of atoms forming the brain from being itself a thinking-machine in virtue of that nature which physics leaves undetermined and undeterminable.' In short, physics has discovered certain curious connections between the things with which it deals, but the intrinsic essence of those things lies outside its province. In other words, natural science consists of the formulation of conceptual relations between percepts: in so far as these conceptual relations have a predictive power, they are useful to us; more than that we cannot legitimately claim.

The preceding reflections, if they are accepted, have two consequences. On the one hand, they narrow the domain of natural science; on the other, they reveal the extent to which the mind creates the so-called realm of natural law. In consequence, they certainly make us doubt whether human actions, which are the result (as most of us believe) of the working of the mind, can be brought within any such realm. It is, of course, possible to argue that our free-will is an illusion and that all our actions are determined, not by mental decisions, but by physico-chemical or bio-chemical causes. I confess that to myself it is a fantastic hypothesis that, let us say, the criticisms which this paper may receive from some ecclesiastical controversialist should be determined, not by the ideas which I am putting before you, but by material causes like the arrangement of the molecules in his brain due to the physical conformation of the print which he reads. I do not, of course, pretend to be able to explain the relation of mind and body, and I confess that none of the many theories which have been put forward are

free from objection. But it seems to me that the physical and mental or psychical worlds are in truth only different aspects of a single unity. Einstein has made most thoughtful people aware that space and time are artificial constructions by which the human mind breaks up a single unity, space-time. We in like manner observe embodied minds: personality, as we know it, is partly physical and partly psychical. Body and mind are not separately given to our experience. If this two-aspect theory, as it is commonly called, be adopted, perplexity remains. How can the physical side of the unity belong to a mechanistic system, complete in itself, while the mind is free? If free-will is a fact, it must be allowed that the influence of mind in the physical world may to some extent modify any mechanistic schemes which we may accept as valid for physico-chemical processes.

We are, I must confess, at the present time confronted by two unsolved and at present insoluble problems. In the first place, we cannot understand how mental processes can affect physical events. In the second place, if the mind influences the physical world, we cannot explain why the laws of that world appear to form a closed system.

As a way out of the first difficulty, many have assumed that there is associated with mind some 'vital force.' Those who make this hypothesis, however, have never been able to point to any definite process in which such vital force discloses its activity. The progress of bio-chemistry reveals a marvellously complex set of physico-chemical processes, but apparently these are all expressible as sequences in the inorganic realm and need no extraneous factor to explain how they take place. This is not to say that by the concepts of physics and chemistry we can completely explain all biological processes. For instance, the duplication of the fertilized germ-cell remains a mystery. The biologist who sees such duplication taking place under a microscope is in the presence of what von Uexküll calls *organization according to plan*, and such organization cannot be thought of in terms merely of mechanism. The whole operation of cell-division is a 'super-mechanical process.' The analogy of the unfolding of a framework is, as Driesch showed, entirely unconvincing. A framework is made of parts fitted together: when

one tears it asunder, it is a framework no longer. If there were such an invisible framework present in the germ, it would be cut into two when the germ was halved. Driesch showed that the result of halving a germ-cell was, if it developed, the production of, not two half-animals, but of two perfect animals, each of half the normal size. Von Uexküll imagines that the genes in the germ-cell have the power to convert an extra-spatial and extra-temporal plan into a physical phenomenon. He speaks of their activating certain ferments which thus cause the observed changes in the germ. I cannot myself believe that his theory escapes the objections which can be brought against all types of vitalism. It assumes some sort of psychical influence over material things, and this was effectively satirized half a century ago by W. K. Clifford, the first Englishman to realize the importance of Riemann's theory of space. Clifford compared such theories of 'mental force' to the belief that the wagons of a railway train are held together by the friendly feeling of the engine-driver for the guard. A solution of our difficulties must, as I have indicated, come through a recognition of the fact that mind and body are not separate entities; they are two aspects of a single unity whose nature we do not at present understand.

But even if we could understand the interaction of mind and matter, there would still remain the problem as to how mental action could influence the course of events in physical systems which are apparently complete in themselves. Some of our philosophers with an inadequate mathematical equipment seem to be satisfied with the idea that the will may exercise a sort of guiding power in changing certain crucial directions without interfering with the great principle of the conservation of energy. It is easy, in support of such a position, to point to the existence of guiding constraints which do no work, though they crucially affect the safe launching of a great ship. But all such pleas fail to satisfy the mathematical physicist. It is certainly possible that the mind does no work when it interferes with a physical system, and that therefore mental decisions do not upset the law of conservation of energy. But, none the less, if the mind has any effect at all in the physical universe, the dynamical system of which we may imagine that universe to consist will cease to be self-contained. In other words, it will no longer function in

accordance with the established laws of dynamics. Somewhere or another there will be an action to which there corresponds no reaction, and consequently Newton's third law of motion will not hold good.

Out of the dilemma thus created no one has so far suggested a satisfactory mode of escape. Certain consequences which can be deduced from Einstein's general theory of relativity seem to indicate that some of the great laws of physics are disguised identities and therefore do not affect freedom of action. This appears to be true, for instance, of the law of gravitation: it does not limit the possibility of human action because violation of it is inconceivable. Professor Weyl, the great exponent of Einstein's discovery, has said in his book, *Space, Time, Matter:* 'Freedom of action in the world is no more restricted by the rigorous laws of field physics than it is by the validity of the laws of Euclidean geometry according to the usual view.' What this means is best understood by an analogy. If Euclid's geometry be true, it is impossible to draw on a flat sheet of paper a circle of which the circumference shall be exactly three times the diameter. None the less, we do not regard such impossibility as limiting our freedom to draw what we like.

If the great field-laws of physics are disguised identities, the fact affords an escape from part of our dilemma. But these laws do not embrace the whole of those which govern the physical realm. There are, in addition, statistical laws which express the behaviour of crowds or swarms of objects. Now, if the mind can act on the atoms or electrons which belong to any such swarms, it is clear that it must influence the behaviour of the crowd, and that it therefore must modify the statistical law which expresses such behaviour. But so far no such result of the influence of the mind on statistical laws has been discovered. Until it is discovered we have no conclusive answer to those who assert that human consciousness is but a by-product of chains of phenomena in the physical world which it is powerless to influence.

This conclusion will doubtless be disconcerting to some here who would have desired, if they did not expect, that I should tell them that it had become scientifically impossible for anyone to maintain to-day the mechanistic determinism which is

commonly described as materialism. In excuse I can only plead that in speaking to you on such a subject to-day I must conform to the attitude of a man of science. It has been well said that 'the great scientist is he who keeps clear of fanaticism and crankiness by continuous moral effort, by effacing his own peculiarities, wishes, desires and interests in order to get as unbiased a view as possible of the facts.'

Yet great physicists and the progress of physical science itself give us reason to think that, as knowledge extends and crucial experiments are devised, human consciousness will be proved to interfere in the apparently closed systems of physical phenomena. Weyl says that 'physics at its present stage can in nowise be regarded as lending support to the belief that there is a causality of physical nature which is founded on rigorously exact laws.' And I would remind you that, in including the doctrine of conservation of mass within the more general principle of conservation of energy, physicists are now agreed that their old-time measurements were at fault in that they could not detect the mass or weight of heat-energy lost in combustion.

Perhaps you will permit me in conclusion briefly to relate what I have said to two other problems of surpassing interest to all who accept the Christian outlook upon life. I have indicated that, as it seems to me, we cannot separate mind and body in man: they are two aspects of a single unity. How then, it may be asked, can we continue to believe in the existence of human personality after bodily death? I would answer that our belief in the survival of human personality is bound up with our conception of the nature of God. If we accept's Christ's view of God, we cannot believe that He will allow anything of value in his universe to be destroyed; and we can confidently claim that in general the spirit of man is of such value as to be worthy of preservation. How man's spirit or personality will be preserved we cannot say: shall we not be content with St. Paul's confident hope that God will give it a body? I would urge that in this matter our difficulties are no greater than those difficulties with regard to the whole of the future life which the doctrine of relativity has thrust upon us. A generation ago it was customary to say that Heaven was a state and not a place, the implication being that the life after death was in time and not in space.

Einstein has, however, demonstrated that space and time form a single complex which we arbitrarily break up in our thought. We have no right to postulate that in the world to come part of this complex will be destroyed while the other part remains intact. In fact, with regard to space and time in the Kingdom of Heaven very much the same difficulties arise as with regard to body and personality. In neither case can natural science give effective guidance.

The other matter to which I would briefly allude concerns the evolution of human personality. It is now generally agreed that all the higher faculties of man had their beginnings in lower forms of life. We can trace in the past history of life upon this earth a vast sequence of progressive change. But I think that throughout this change we must recognize creative activity; and, further, such creative activity is not from within; it is not the result of an innate urge or of some life-force trying to express itself. The source of such activity is outside the organism; and its shows its action in the mutations or inheritable variations which, as it appears, constantly arise in the chromosomes of the germ-cell. It seems, moreover, that mental characters, which are closely correlated with brain structure, are inherited in exactly the same way as bodily characters; and that their development has been by a series of mutations whose origin is to be found in the Divine purpose which runs through all creation. In fact, it is God that hath made us, and not we ourselves. There are many men of science who would say that we have no right to import into the evolutionary scheme, which biologists describe, such ideas as spiritual activity or Divine purpose. In the processes which biology describes such ideas, it may be rightly contended, have no place. Yet, when we seek to understand evolution as a whole, we must find a clue not only to the intrinsic nature of its processes, but also to the existence and powers of the human beings who have resulted from its operation; and then I would urge that in all we are forced to see the action of the Divine Father of Christ's revelation.

# WORSHIP AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE

By A. L. Lilley, Canon Residentiary of Hereford.

THERE is nothing perhaps more necessary to the Christian life than that it should from its very beginnings be consciously connected with a true conception of worship. Now all the great Christian theologians who have dealt with this subject are agreed in basing their discussion of it on that great saying of St. Paul: 'I beseech you, brethren, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is your reasonable service.'[1] They have all alike recognised that the only true and adequate worship of God, the only worship of Him which is in accordance with the true reason, is the service of a life accordant with His law. For that true worship, symbolical worship, the worship which we offer through certain forms and on certain formal occasions, can never be a substitute. But, on the other hand, that vital worship can never dispense with the various aids and stimulations which the worship of set forms and occasions so abundantly supplies. Our worship in church ought to be for us all, from the oldest to the youngest, a conscious discipline of our spirits so that they may be able through every bodily function and activity to respond to and obey the will of God.

Let us consider for a moment in what that discipline consists. Every time we meet to take part in an act of worship we are leaving behind for a moment all the various interests — interests often in conflict with one another and always confusing by their mere variety and disconnectedness — which fill up the foreground of our existence. And we are, or ought to be, concentrating in thought on a permanent and unchanging background to life, a background which is the same for all our lives, a background whose unchangeable perfection alone gives meaning to our otherwise blind, unmeaning, purposeless activities. That background to life is God. But merely to call it God,

[1] *Romans* xii, 1.

even though with a certain awed reverence, is not enough. That reverence, indeed, is of the very essence of religion and of worship. Yet not only is it not independent of thought, but without thought it cannot persist. We ought in every act of worship to ascend, as the greatest of mediaeval theologians put it, with the mind towards God. That ascent of the mind to God was his definition of prayer, and no better or more adequate definition can ever, probably, be attempted. And first of all that ascent will mean, as it meant for him, the conscious contemplation of a Supreme Reason there in the eternal background of life. Here in the foreground there are our own poor efforts to be reasonable, to find in our own activities and in the play of natural forces around us, which so greatly limit and determine our activities, some poor imperfect show of reason. And these efforts so often fall back defeated that the temptation to become altogether sceptical as to the rationality of the universe is great and insistent. It may be all, we are inclined to think at times, nothing more than the accidental play of blind forces of which we are the puppets and the dupes. But again some fundamental sanity in us saves us from thinking thus brain-sickly of things, persuades us that our reason, however confused and imperfect its methods, however unsatisfying and even self-stultifying its results may often appear to be, is yet the legitimate offspring of a Supreme, an Eternal and Perfect Reason, in which and through which all things subsist. It is our belief in that background of absolute reason that alone gives sanity, meaning, purpose to all our experiences. And one object of all our worship is to foster and cultivate in ourselves that supremely true and saving belief by contemplating with reverential awe the ultimate and perfect reason which alone gives reality and value to our own poor gropings after truth.

Again, the foreground of life is a scene of the most baffling moral confusion. It is not only that we human souls are infinitely careless about the clearly-known distinctions of right and wrong, that we thoughtlessly stake upon the wayward issues of some passing attraction, of some momentary advantage or pleasure, the sterling coin that has been minted in the general conscience of humanity as if it were so many worthless counters. That moral levity in ourselves and in the whole world of men

about us is a sufficient stumbling-block to the soul that still tries to preserve its native eagerness for right. But there is something more perplexing still. It is that so often the way of right is not clear at all, that in the court of conscience no clear and unequivocal verdict is obtainable on matters which most urgently demand an unhesitating judgment. There are cases where we must decide in order to act, and yet where every possible decision entails some injury to others which we should have wished to avoid and yet which cannot be avoided. The only difference between one decision and another is a difference in the direction of the injury, a difference in the persons on whom it must fall. And what a long-drawn moral agony life would be if this foreground were its all, if faith did not perceive an eternal background of immutable right which inspires, upholds, and leads to a blessed completion our faithful if faulty gropings and endeavours after right. Again, worship is the joyful contemplation of that Eternal Right by which our souls are disciplined for right action in this world of mists and imperfect lights.

Again, our life is regulated in a degree surpassing all others by its affections. We are still more fundamentally social beings than even creatures of thought and of action. What supremely makes us men, what constitutes the specific quality in us which we call humanity, is some secret sympathy between us in virtue of which we share one another's experience more intimately than we can express it to one another in word or through any other outward symbol. Yet here again all is imperfection, disappointment, confusion. Our affections are so often betrayed by their own short-sighted eagerness. They are undisciplined, inconstant, even domineering. In their despotic claim of monopoly they violate that reverence which it is their supreme function to cultivate and foster. From being the salt of life they may become its poison; from the means of its purification, the cause of its putrefaction. They were meant to educate the self into the divine power of being more-than-self. But they may, alas! inflame the self into the madness of a fever which is self-consuming and self-destructive. Or they may simply die away and leave us the mere husks of men, soulless and solitary in a loveless world. But again faith descries a background to life of Eternal Love, of the patient, abiding sympathy of an

Eternal Heart which believes in men even though they lose belief in themselves, which by its inexhaustible love and understanding is working to redeem them throughout the eternities. And worship is again the faithful, diligent, ever-renewed contemplation of this Infinite Love.

The life which we men have to live upon this earth is a life of thought and knowledge, a life of action, and a life of affection. Those elements and aspects of our life may not all be of equal value. The native capacity for one or the other may vary for each of us. But assuredly they are all necessary for the fullness of life, and each of them depends for its due development upon the due cultivation of the others. The thinker who is not also in some degree a man of action suffers even in his thought. It becomes cold, abstract, uninspiring. And again, the man of action who does not or cannot give himself time to reflect deeply and sincerely on the larger bearings of his own action, and on the kind of purposiveness that makes all human action worthy, is in danger of becoming a mere soulless piece of human machinery. And once again both thought and action will be dry and sapless, useless for the world's deepest needs, unless they are rooted in a patient and untiring sympathy, unless they proceed from a passionate desire to understand, to help, to serve, not men as we want them to be, but men as they are. Life so conceived and lived is the true worship of God, but that life depends upon the constant contemplation of God as the Supreme Reason, the Supreme Goodness, the Supreme Love by whom our poor imperfect thought and action and affection are accepted and made fruitful. And just that is worship.

# THE ACTION FRANCAISE*

By the Rev. Alfred Fawkes, M.A., author of *Studies in Modernism,* etc.

## I.

THE Action Française is a League of French Nationalists, professing monarchical principles, not only in theory, but, as their name implies, in practice and action. The active support of these principles is, they believe, essential to the safety of their country, whose defences and powers of resistance have been undermined by sixty years of Republican Government and by the repudiation of authority on which it is based. Not all its members are Catholics; its director, M. Maurras, is not even a Christian. But its advocacy of Legitimism commended it to the clergy and the royalist party; its militant tactics to the army; and its Frondist tendencies to the Adullamites—'Everyone that was in distress, and in debt, and discontented.' During the pontificate of Pius X it enjoyed the active support of Rome, as the champion of the most extreme form of Ultramontanism. This championship was political, not religious: M.M. Maurras and Daudet argue that the same may be said of their present conflict with the Papacy. Pius XI answers that it is for him, not for the A.F., to draw the line between the two provinces; and that what he forbids is not that French Catholics should hold royalist principles, or vote for royalist candidates when any such can be found, but that they should go down into the streets and riot. In other words, that their opposition to the *de facto* Government should be *active*. This would lead to civil war at home, and in all probability to the re-kindling of the European world conflict from which civilization has escaped, if indeed it has escaped, by the skin of its teeth. If the methods of the Vatican are open to criticism—and it is impossible to read M. Léon Daudet's *Sous la Terreur* without seeing that they are—it must be remembered that the emergency is grave and the danger imminent. Individual liberty is valued more in

**Saint-Siège, 'Action Française,' et 'Catholiques Intégraux,'* par Nicolas Fontaine. (Paris: J. Gamber, Editeur, 7 Rue Danton. 12 fr. 1928.)

England than in France; but during the war we were content to suffer the loss of it to avoid greater evils: and under similar circumstances we should be ready to do so again.

Finally, Integrists, or *Catholiques intégraux*, are the continental equivalent to the American so-called Fundamentalists, whose device is 'The Bible from cover to cover,' or what they describe as 'A Four-Square Gospel.' Both are the zealots of creeds which have outlived themselves and their significance, and survive, like the strata of earlier geological formations, in a new world.

## II.

Leo XIII, who was in the line of the greater Pontiffs, was haunted by the fear that France was the storm-centre of Catholicism. This fear was the key to the policy of his long pontificate. In his dealings with France he walked warily; he was long-suffering; arbitrary as his temper was, he endured all things; his last words to the then ambassador of the Republic were that 'nothing,' he emphasized the word, 'should make him break with France.' The danger did not take the shape that might have been expected: Gallicanism was a thing of the past; Modernism of the future. But it came: and it is from the Extreme Right that it threatens. It may pass, as so many dangers have passed; threatened men live long. But it cannot fail to leave Catholicism permanently weakened. We live in a time when neither the Catholic Church, nor any other, can afford to risk any avoidable strain.

The A.F. is a mixed magnitude; we find ourselves in an inverted world in which conflicting parts are taken by the actors: Integrists assume the part of Gallicans; Liberals seem more papal than the Pope. It is difficult to think of an English parallel. But, if Hobbes had come forward as an advocate of the divine right of bishops, and shewn his zeal for the Apostolic Succession by slitting Puritan ears, Laud would have found him an embarrassing ally; and had the philosopher added to his religious enthusiasm a policy which would have led to civil war in England and to a general conflagration in Europe, the Star Chamber would have made short work with him. M. Charles Maurras, the life and soul of the A.F., is one of those

able men who in troubled times exercise an influence out of proportion to their undoubted parts. His religious, or at least theological, position is singular. He describes Christianity as '*ordure*': '*avec votre religion depuis dix-huit cents ans vous avez sali le monde.*' He is, however, an Ultramontane of the Ultramontanes: not because he regards the Papacy as a Divine institution, but because he sees in it a principle of order which, in virtue of the governmental, or Roman, element which it embodies, is the most effective antidote to the anarchy for which Christianity stands. One is reminded of Charles Austin's well-known saying: 'For God's sake, don't touch the Church of England; it is the one thing that stands between us and Christianity.' In politics, he is a monarchist; in philosophy, a neo-positivist. A combination of incompatibles! But there are temperaments to which paradox is attractive: and the disillusionment which followed the war, and even more the peace, left the European, and in particular the Latin, mind unsettled and open to agitation. Hence a Mussolini in Italy, and a Maurras in France. The former is of the type of the Greek τύραννος; the latter of a Sophist crossed by a *Septembriseur*. 'We should not shrink from assassination,' he says. The remarkable thing is that, with these views, he should be acclaimed in orthodox circles as *le maître de la jeunesse catholique*.

## III.

What has the Church to say to this? This depends on which section of the Roman Curia, the *zelanti* or the *diplomatici*, has for the moment the upper hand. Under Leo XIII, an opportunist born, the *zelanti* had short shrift. The Pope was masterful: in the case of Cardinal Pitra he acted as summarily as Pius XI has in that of the Jesuit Cardinal Billot and P. le Floch to-day. But Popes come and go; the Congregations and the Curia remain. The Pontificate of Leo was regarded by his opponents as an interlude: it would pass, and the permanent policy of Rome be resumed. It proved a longer interlude than had been expected: but with the accession of Pius X, 1903, a storm of reaction broke upon the Church. Leo had refused either to break with France or repudiate learning. Pius X did

both with a light heart and clamorously. That he did so conscientiously is a poor apology; there are beliefs which no one has a right to hold. It is difficult to believe that he was ignorant of the character of the men whom he employed as his agents. But he had persuaded himself that the thought, the life, and the civilization of the lay world were in revolt against authority Divine and human, and to be crushed by all means: 'here were two swords,' and he would have neither borne in vain. Heretics should be dealt with by the spiritual; rebels by the temporal — *sed ad nutum et patientiam sacerdotis*. Did not 'Get thee behind me, Satan,' follow almost in the same breath 'Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church'? It does so still, and both the promise and the rebuke were addressed to the same apostle: a Church is a necessary evil, the latter as well as the former word is to be accentuated; and a bad religion is a bad, a very bad, thing. 'The Rock of St. Peter at its summit enjoys a pure and serene atmosphere'—Newman at least tried hard to persuade himself that it did. 'But' (he adds) 'there is a great deal of Roman malaria at the foot of it': and under Pius X this malaria mounted high. In 1907 the Encyclical *Pascendi* created 'Councils of Vigilance'—*i.e.* organized bodies of informers—in every diocese. Spying became a fine art; and was imposed upon their members. It was a reign of terror; men spoke behind closed doors and in whispers; walls had ears. A generation ago Montalembert had described the Pope as 'the Idol of the Vatican.' He was now a Dalai Lama, or living Deity. As the nineteenth century had been the century of Ultramontanism, of the assertion of the claims of the Papacy in their most absolute and unconditioned form, so (it was said) the twentieth was that of *Papisme* — the devotion to the person of the reigning Pope. At the accession of Benedict XV (1914) the waters abated. He made short work with the odious crew which had surrounded his predecessor — and *how* they hated him! He would hear nothing of integrism or integrists. Here the Encyclical *Ad Beatissimi* (1914) is emphatic. 'Be not many masters.' 'We desire that all should abstain from the use of certain appellations, or party names, which have begun of late years to distinguish Catholics from Catholics.' 'Let no private individual either in the press or in speeches or writings set himself

up as a master in the Church.' During the war it was inevitable that political feeling should run high; the situation was strained to breaking point. Like most neutrals, he thought a German victory probable; and desired in either case to safeguard the interests of the Church and of the Holy See. There was every reason why he should do so; there was also every reason why he should have done no more.

## IV.

In 1922 Pope Benedict died, and was succeeded by the reigning Pontiff. '*Ce candidat appartient au clan libéral. Il est très soutenu par les Italiens*,' was the comment of the A.F. The latter is scarcely a reproach to an Italian bishop; nor was he a liberal either in politics or in theology: at Rome, as has been said, party distinctions do not run on these lines. But he was a *diplomatico* — a scholar and a man of sense and judgment, who knew his world and had had experience of affairs. His election, as is generally the case, was the result of a compromise; and where this is so a Pope seldom starts with an entirely free hand. But his main work was marked out for him; it was the repair of the destruction consequent on the war and on the Peace of Versailles which followed it. The Near East, which he knew well, was necessarily a leading feature in his policy. The Orthodox Churches were in ruins; but in the East mass conversion was still possible, and though France has been called the eldest daughter of the Church, the Church is a fertile mother of children; and an Apostle has the care not of one only, but of all. The particularism of the A.F. sees France only; and the France which it sees is that of a party. It resents the Pope's intervention in politics. One is reminded of Melbourne's saying, that no one had a greater respect for Christianity than he; but that really when it came to an interference with a man's private life, he demurred. Both politics and religion are all-embracing. On this the reader may be referred to Dean Rashdall's recently republished Essays on the Rights of the State, the Church, and the Individual.[1] The question is not whether their rights overlap; they do; but (1) whether, in spite

[1] *Ideas and Ideals*, pp. 22—77.

of this, the three do not form a unity; and (2), in particular, whether the human conscience, individual or aggregate, is subject to an authority placed without it, and exercised by men who speak in the name of Heaven. There are no such men, and there is no such authority. 'Believe in the Pope? I would as soon believe in Jupiter,' said Dr. Arnold. But with regard to the substantial unity of life and the impossibility of dividing it into watertight compartments, the Pope is right and the A.F. wrong, and under present circumstances the particularism of the A.F. is a danger to France and a menace to the peace of Europe. It is absurd to suppose that Pius XI is in sympathy with what are called the 'lay laws,' or has any preference for the Republican form of government. But he has the sense to see that this form of government is that which divides Frenchmen the least, and that the 'lay laws' are for France a condition of national unity. If French Catholics are wise, they can ensure a moderate application of these laws; but to agitate for their repeal is folly. The policy of the Holy See is to avoid conflicts; that of the A.F. to multiply and embitter them. To Pius X, M. Maurras was *un bel difensore della fede*. To Pius XI, he is an avowed enemy of Christ. He cannot accept a defence of Catholicism which is based on hatred of Christianity and regards Catholicism as the most effectual corrective to the evils which its Founder has brought into the world.

## V.

The repressive methods of the Vatican are frankly detestable. But 'Priests of all religions are the same.' Mr. Spurgeon (it is said) once brought down the house by announcing in stentorian tones that the Baptist Church was the only Church that had never persecuted. The statement was received with immense applause. 'Shall I tell you why?' he continued. 'Because it has never been in in its power to do so.' And we may be thankful that it is not in the power of the Archbishop of Canterbury to deprive the Bishop of Norwich or to refuse the sacraments and Christian burial to the readers of the *Morning Post*. But the latrines of centuries are not cleaned out in a generation. Autocracy is a legal fiction; the power of the Popes

is limited by vested interests, by custom, and by routine. The gossip of Rome, which is seldom without a certain verisimilitude, attributes a significant remark to Pius XI referring to a recent condemnation by the Holy Office. He had read the condemned book (he said)—which was perhaps M. Brassac's *Manuel Biblique*?—and saw nothing to disapprove of in it. 'But,' he added with a certain irony, 'we must obey our masters.' Institutions which have survived their usefulness are waiting for their transformation; their character is moulded less from within than from without.

## VI.

I opened this paper by saying that Leo XIII was in the line of the greater Pontiffs. May I close it by a reference to a remarkable, though too little known, book, *Scenes and Portraits*,[2] in which the author describes an interview between this Pope and Renan in 'The Paradise of the Disillusioned.' Its actuality, it is not too much to say, is that of Landor's *Imaginary Conversations*, its satire that of Lucian's *Dialogues of the Dead*.

'I have often thought,' the Pope is made to say, 'that the principal hope for religion lies in the fact that the great majority of men do not think.' A Pope is to be judged not so much by his official acts—these may be imposed upon him by circumstances—as by the temper which he fosters in the Church. The nature of his office, the nature indeed of office as such, compels him to claim the privileges claimed by his predecessors; Leo XIII could not undo the acts of Pius IX. He resigned nothing; but he allowed certain questions to fall into abeyance: when he was urged, for example, to define the Assumption of the Virgin, he refused. And there are claims which in time became rather historical than actual—such as, for example, the claim to the Kingdom of France, retained so long, in the style of 'King of Great Britain, France and Ireland,' by our own Royal House. Leo came to the throne under disadvantageous circumstances. He regained much that Pius had lost—the confidence of governments, the respect of practical politicians, and, in a measure, of the lay world. He discouraged rather than condemned liberal movements in the Church; 'the time of figs was not yet'; and

[2] By Frederic Manning, 1909 (John Murray).

by leaving certain positions undefended he secured them from attack. The Encyclical on Biblical studies — *Providentissimus Deus* — and the appointment of the Biblical Commission were his two great mistakes; here he was upon what was to him and his advisers unknown ground. His mind was concrete; he recognized republics and democracies as facts. He attempted, nor did he wholly fail, to commend the Church to the working classes; he was acclaimed as *Le Pape des Ouvriers*. But he was defeated by the extremists of his own side. Had his policy been continued it might conceivably have been, at least moderately, successful. A re-organized and, in the literal sense of the word, 'reformed' Catholicism might still, perhaps, draw into itself much of the floating idealism of our age. But, if a certain approximation of ideas is possible, the 'All or Nothing' alternative spells disaster. People are unwilling to be forced back upon Nothing: but they neither will, nor can, nor should accept All.

## VII.

It was a noble dream. But it came through the Gate of Ivory: his successor was Pius X. The *détente* which came in with Benedict XV continues under the present Pontiff. Instances to the contrary may be quoted: but these are lesser truths which obscure greater. The door has been opened, and to-day the question between the Pope and the A.F. is whether it is to remain open—I do not say wide open, but at least ajar—or shut with a bang. A glance at the representatives of the rival factions is decisive as to the issue between them: movements, like men, are known by their friends. What is known in France as *Maurrasianisme* is a blind Samson sporting in the House of Dagon, the fall of which was fatal not only to the lords of the Philistines, but to 'all the people that were therein.' The Church may repair many of her losses if she will only remain silent on the question of dogma. Time will obtain a measure of tacit acceptance for almost any dogma, because for the majority truth is merely something which has been repeated over and over again. But there must be, not indeed an exact, but an approximate correspondence between the formula and those who accept it. The belief in miracles, for example, arose in an age

in which everything was a miracle; and in which, therefore, a miracle was not what we now understand by a miracle at all. For us, such an age is past: we cannot now imagine a Christ who, literally and in time and space, multiplies loaves, walks on the sea, or turns water into wine. Such marvels are, like the shores of Ausonia, *semper cedentia retro*: they are rather symbols than events.

## VIII.

The Church (it has been said) can triumph over the facts of history; the great fabric of the Papacy has been built up by a series of such triumphs. What it cannot triumph over is the spirit of the age. It has a large body of what may be called implicit members, who describe themselves as Catholics, and do so in good faith, but without the least knowing what the term implies. It has also a smaller body of apologists, whose business in life consists, it seems, in the vain attempt to reconcile its teaching with the knowledge of the lay world. But is there a single individual in either who accepts this teaching without colouring it by his own ideas? The Church cannot control the new movement, which will either transform or destroy it: nay, it seems to be itself dissolving, and taking on a fluid form. 'The Christianity of the future,' says Father Tyrrell, 'will consist of mysticism and charity, and possibly the Eucharist in its primitive form as the outward bond.'[3] But such a development, if it is to come, is distant: and half, or more than half, the evils which afflict mankind have been caused by the premature hurrying on or the over-long postponement of changes which were, indeed, in the nature of things — but not in this or that particular form, place, or time. The A.F. appears to combine the worst elements of the old order with all that is least acceptable in the new. On the religious side, it might perhaps have been left to work out its own absurdities. But on the political, this was impossible: *Tua res agitur paries cum proximus ardet:* a conflagration does not brook delay. The fear is that the fire-engines of the Vatican may be obsolete and ineffectual. Their model is that of those of the sixteenth century — and it is now out of date.

[3] *Life*, by M. D. Petre, ii, 377.

# MODERNISM AND THE YOUNG

By the Rev. J. C. Nunns, M.A.

A PAPER on such a subject as this must observe strict limitations. I have here no intention of straying on to the general subject of reform in religious education, upon which a whole literature exists, and which concerns clergy and teachers of all schools of thought alike. What I am here concerned with is merely one part of the subject, the question, namely, how far teaching is apt to be at fault through the disregard of modern thought and knowledge. There are two ways in which this may operate: the child may be listless and bored, owing really to an obsoleteness of subject-matter of which he is in some degree conscious; or the lesson may be a seeming success while all the time the teacher is really laying up difficulties for later years. Three instances of this latter danger present themselves.

(1) Religion postulates a beyond, and this is naturally conceived of in terms of space and time. Both of these conceptions, but especially the former, are profoundly affected by modern knowledge. It was a bewildering loss when the astronomical discoveries of the sixteenth century made it impossible for the human spirit to rest in the simple thought of a heavenly region beyond the skies, a loss which would have been more acutely felt if the world had faced the implications of its new knowledge with more thoroughness and consistency. The adjustment of religion with modern conceptions of the physical universe is still only half-heartedly made, and most people must at some time bring their beliefs to terms with ordinary scientific notions. Here, then, is a problem for the teacher. Perhaps no change is needed in the teaching of quite small children. It is quite possible that in early childhood the mental habits of the race must be recapitulated in this as in other things, but if so there must be at some time a transition, either sudden or gradual, which we have no right to leave to chance. The teacher should at any rate enquire whether the transition is being made, and perhaps assist at it. At some stage or other of the child's development he can endeavour to find out exactly what is the conception of heaven, of the

'whereabouts' of God, of the angels, which the child possesses; if he shows a reluctance to disclose his ideas, a feeling that he is being drawn into something babyish, it only shows how necessary it is to give him ideas of which he need not be ashamed. A few simple questions, such as whether an aeroplane could take us nearer to heaven may help to clear the issue without any appearance of contempt, which is a thing most carefully to be avoided in this connection, and then perhaps the thought can be implanted of a spiritual order which is not part of the material world but another mode of existence. A fairly good analogy, and one within the grasp of a child, is the way in which the dream world and the waking world exist side by side, so that we can pass out of one into the other without literal locomotion, it being made clear, of course, that in this case the waking world, with its greater reality, is the analogue of the spiritual, not the material. Such a process of correction need very likely be performed only once and for all, and yet how often is it done? Some teaching of this kind is especially necessary in any conscientious lesson on the Ascension. At some age or other, say at twelve years old, the child has outgrown the stage at which the narrative may be left to take its own effect. It should be made clear to him that this was the passing of Christ from the life we know into a spiritual mode of existence, and that if it is narrated in the Bible as an upward rising, this is because human language is here doing its best to describe what it is really unequal to describing.

(2) Many religious stumbling-blocks originate in the idea that if a thing is in the Bible it must be true. That a child should assume this is so, is perfectly natural and inevitable. He is rightly taught to venerate the Bible, and inasmuch as the Bible consists largely of narrative statements, it is natural to suppose on the face of it that their historical truth is involved in their sacred character. Unless this tendency is corrected, not in mere piecemeal fashion but as a general principle, trouble is bound to follow. What is needed is that a boy should learn, as far as he is capable of learning, in what degree and for what purpose historical information is to be expected in the Bible. A good many of them do as a matter of fact ask to-day, 'How do we know?' and to leave them to suppose that the official answer is 'Because the Bible says so,' is fatal. When the question is a genuine one

it must be met by a thorough-going, if elementary, exposition of what inspiration is. It must be explained that the Bible was written by men who could see the deep things of God, as holy people can, not men who had anything so unlikely or unreal as supernatural information about the past. At present, though few children perhaps are taught that everything in the Bible is true, they are allowed to feel that exceptions to the rule of historical veracity are grudgingly admitted, as if the admission had something a little bit wicked about it. The teacher must first clearly face the issue for himself. The Bible is a book of spiritual guidance; what position does a narrative of past events occupy in such a book? Where, as in a number of Old Testament narratives, it can in no way be regarded as a 'saving truth,' should not its historical veracity be frankly regarded as a thing of no importance whatever? Where, on the other hand, it deals with a genuine element in religious belief, do we believe the narrative because it is in the Bible, or does our belief rest upon some wider basis? Woe betide us if it does not! Having cleared his own mind, he can decide upon his plan of teaching. Many narratives can be taught as material illustrative of spiritual truth; many of the dialogues between God and the patriarchs can be taught as being no less dramatic and artificial than Shakespeare. It is, however, of the greatest importance that such teaching as this should always have its positive side. The more the child is allowed to be familiar with the idea of legend in the Bible, the more important it is to show the genuine historicity of what we do regard as historical. In Old Testament lessons the general preparation of a nation for the coming Messiah must be shown to be real history, and clearly marked off from what is doubtful and legendary; and above all it must be made clear that the distinction between the Christian era and the early parts of the Bible is made, not just for reasons of piety, but because the one belongs to the broad daylight of history and the other to a dim and distant epoch of which we cannot expect exact knowledge.

(3) When we pass to the New Testament we come to the most difficult part of our question, the teaching of miracles. At first we may be inclined to say that the answer is simple: teach them if you believe them and don't teach them if you don't. But the matter is not quite so simple as that, especially in view of the fact that there are many teachers who, without having definitely

parted company with a belief in miracles, certainly dislike giving lessons on them. It is admitted on all sides that what we want is a more real and human picture of Christ. 'Nine people out of ten,' it has been said, 'regard our Lord as a shadowy, semi-historical figure, almost entirely aloof from reality, and having next to no contact with daily life as they know it,' and similar laments are constantly made. The hymn and the stained-glass window are usually burdened with the blame for this. But is there not also a less comfortable explanation? Is it not simply that from early years the story of Christ has been associated with the miraculous *given in a facile and un-wondering way?* It must be remembered that as the growing child slowly sorts out what belongs to the real world from what belongs to fairyland, a story full of marvellous occurrences will without any irreverence or conscious unbelief tend to be assimilated to the latter rather than the former. It is only the nature-miracles that are here in question. The picture of Christ the Divine Healer need cause no serious divergence from real life in the mind of the boy or girl, but if these former are just accepted without ever having caused a moment's astonishment or incredulity, there is good reason to suppose that such acquiescence betokens a failure of connection with their real mental world. A teacher who believed enthusiastically in these stories might avoid this evil, just as a teacher who believed enthusiastically in some alleged instance of modern levitation might win over his class after some preliminary incredulity to his view; but anything short of this, any introduction of miracles taught half-heartedly or as a matter of course, can only result in vitiating the whole story. In these matters it is of course never possible to begin *de novo*. But if it were, one cannot help thinking that the ideal plan would be to omit from early teaching all mention of the nature-miracles. and then, when a satisfactory picture had been built up in the child's mind, to tell him how, in addition to the stories he has learnt, there are certain other things attributed to Christ, such as turning water into wine, walking on water, and multiplying food; that some people find they can make nothing of these stories, and prefer to think they must have been wrongly inserted; while others find Christ so wonderful that they believe that in some way He could have done even things like these. Such teaching need not be regarded as a veiled attack on the supernatural; it

would really be in the interests of the believer in miracles as much as in those of the unbeliever.

A good instance of this is the story of Christ's baptism. This episode and the ensuing temptation in the wilderness (the inner call followed by the crisis consequent on a task fully realised) form momentous preliminaries to the ministry of Christ. An intelligent conception of them is most desirable. But it is a story in the handling of which teachers are sometimes tempted to take advantage of the children's love of the picturesque, or of their fondness for concrete enumeration, without regard for ulterior consequences. It is easy to charm the imagination of infants by pointing out what a pretty sight it would be to see a dove fly down, or to invite a class to reckon up how many Persons of the Trinity were present on this occasion, but in either case a wedge of hopeless unreality has been inserted into the story at the outset and an incident of great importance spoilt. But it will be said that the greatest of all miracles, the Resurrection, is one that is central and cannot in this way be postponed. Quite true; but there is little difficulty here. The Resurrection *is* the greatest of all miracles, but it need not affect the life-likeness of the picture of the ministry, for the very reason that it confessedly lies in a region beyond everyday experience. No one, even the most conservative, looks upon it as a mere return to the conditions of ordinary physical life. As the revelation of a new and higher mode of life, made to a few while the busy world rolled on unsuspecting and unconscious, it can be taught as a subject by itself, always remembering, of course, that a due suggestion of mystery and wonderfulness is preserved.

A large number of elementary teachers are no doubt fully alive to the issues here presented, and are making most praiseworthy efforts to deal with them. But it must always be remembered that mere avoidance of what is obsolete or objectionable is not enough; in our anxiety to secure this we may be in danger of omitting some of the great problems of existence and some of the great truths of theology. What we have to do is to discover the form in which these truths can be rightly presented and sincerely believed, and then we can hope that they will give to the religion of the next generation something of the virility which in their older form they gave to the religion of our forefathers.

# REFLECTIONS OF A COUNTRY CLERGYMAN*

By the Rev. J. C. Hardwick, M.A., B.Sc., Vicar of Partington, Cheshire.

IT was the writer's ambition at the age of thirteen to become a country clergyman, and if success in life be to have realized the ambitions of childhood, he has succeeded. Though one has to bear in mind the saying of Amiel (one of the last entries in his *Journal*, and written but a few days before he died): 'Destiny has two ways of crushing us; by refusing our desires—and by fulfilling them.' Yet this is too deep a problem for present discussion; it is our business, rather, to treat some aspects of that life to which it was the writer's early ambition to attain.

Some advantages of the life may first be indicated. The greatest, perhaps, is that you live in the country, away from streets, trams, crowds, picture-theatres, and noise, which last is the curse of modern life. Country vicarages are often much too large, but they are generally delectable places. You have a garden, a lawn, flowers, vegetables, a few fruit trees. Here you can saunter, or sit, or potter about, or put in some hard physical labour. You may grow cabbages, tend your roses, listen to the blackbird, watch the swallows build under your eaves. From this point of view it is one long holiday. The next advantage is that you live among country people. It is true that much can be said to their discredit, and some of their weaknesses will have to be passed under review, but, on the whole, country people are the best to live amongst. In the first place, they are neighbourly; you know them, and see them nearly every day. In a village, every man, woman and child has a place and counts. Moreover, the people are interested in, and their lives are bound up with, plain homely things, such as weather, crops, animals, the condition of buildings, and so on. They are without high-flying notions. They understand neighbourly action, appreciate industry and ability, but theories and idealisms leave them cold, or, rather, antagonize them. Like the philosopher in *Candide*, they cultivate their garden.

* A Paper read to the Bowdon Clerical Society.

But a clergyman, as everyone knows, is concerned chiefly with the female sex. In the country the women who count are hard-working, neighbourly, thrifty, cheerful, clever, managing people; there are in the country no such terribly trying women as one meets in town or (still more) suburban church life. None of them claims to be intellectual or to understand the parson's business better than he does himself. They are far too busy to desire any of those spiritual luxuries which the town parson is always being pestered to provide by women who have too little to employ them. In the country there are no devout spinsters; none of the sort that you see in advanced churches on the South Coast. Most of the women are married, and all have so much to do that they have no leisure for serious mischief. It is true that country women are insatiable gossips, but in this respect they are perhaps not a great deal worse than their town sisters, only as they have a smaller plot of ground to turn over, they deal with it more thoroughly. With regard to country children, they seem to be more home-staying than their counterparts in the towns; presumably there is more to employ them about the house. At any rate, they do not to the same extent expect the clergyman to provide entertainments for them every evening; though, to be sure, they enjoy anything of this sort that may be forthcoming. Compared with town children, they seem shy and reserved and a trifle slow; they are probably ten years or so behind the times, although this is not necessarily a shortcoming.

A great advantage of being a country clergyman is that the demands of country people are very moderate. They expect their clergyman to reside in the village and not always to be running off. Parishioners look to him to visit them if they are sick or in trouble, and to call on them from time to time, and this whether they are Church people or Nonconformists, or even if they are nothing much in particular. He is, in their eyes, a village official as much as a church official; as a freeholder he has a definite status in their community. With regard to church services, he is expected to conduct these decently and with due respect for tradition. All novelties are suspect. In the pulpit it is not expected of him that he should be either erudite or eloquent; erudition is often puzzling, and eloquence is disliked as being redolent of Nonconformity and political Liberalism. Simplicity and brevity are the qualities most valued in a dis-

course; and it is probably not realized how difficult these are of attainment. There is no need to deal from the pulpit with up-to-date problems. Life for these people presents many practical problems, but few theoretical ones. Speculative ideas do not appeal much to country people, though the utterances of the more reflective are not devoid of salt.

Country theology seems to consist of one or two fairly simple and profound ideas: (1) Providence; (2) Your sins will find you out; (3) The good neighbour is the good Christian; (4) Some day and somehow those who are parted by death will be reunited; (5) Jesus Christ is to them an example and inspiration of conduct rather than the subject of theological definition; (6) It is best to assume that good things are precarious. For country people God is a somewhat unaccountable Being, like the English weather; yet He knows what He is doing better than you are likely to. It behoves you to take what you get without grumbling, for the last word is with Him. Still, He will treat you with leniency if you do not set yourself to defy Him. 'Walk humbly with thy God' seems to them good advice, which they try to follow.

Country people rarely criticize their clergyman for his doctrine unless he transgresses well-understood limits of tolerance in speaking of the religious beliefs and customs, or of the social and moral conventions, of other people. They have no keen scent for heresy; though they would be shocked to hear commonly accepted ideas submitted to criticism. They like common sense when they can get it; perhaps not realizing how fallible it is. Samuel Butler's description of the psychology of the English farmer of the early part of last century is still not far from the truth:

> 'Good, sensible fellows who detested theory of any kind . . . Who desired higher prices and cheaper wages, but otherwise were most contented when things were changing least; tolerators, if not lovers, of all that was familiar, haters of all that was unfamiliar; they would have been equally surprised at hearing the Christian religion doubted, and at seeing it practised.'

Country people assume that their parson knows his own business best, and so long as he does not try to lecture them as to how to conduct their own affairs, they are respectful of his pulpit divinity.

Under these circumstances, it might be thought that the

country clergyman can spend a very idle time, and it is true that, if his tastes lie in that direction, he may indulge them. But an idler, like a busy-body, is despised in the country; and the parson would be well-advised to make himself an expert in some interest or hobby, whether breeding fowls, or growing roses, or keeping bees, or studying local history. (He should not, of course, try to teach the farmers agriculture, or come into economic competition with his neighbours.) Even if the parson's hobby should lie altogether outside the range of his flock's interests, such as metaphysics, natural science, or the higher criticism of the Bible, it serves a useful purpose. For even though his people do not understand their clergyman's pursuits, they are inclined to respect a man who is deeply interested in something. To be interested in books is regarded as an eccentricity, but as pardonable and perhaps, in a clergyman, desirable. After all, we cannot all do work that is equally useful. But whatever his hobby or pursuit may be, the country clergyman has ample leisure for it. Indeed, this leisure is not the least of the advantages of his life. He is not hurried or rushed like the town parson; he can do what he has to do quietly and at his own pace, like a man ploughing a field.

Perhaps we have now seen enough of the advantages of the life of a country clergyman; and it is now time to turn to the other side of the picture. The writer once made some trite observations to a country Vicar about the charm of his village, the beauty of the surrounding country, and so on. In reply he quoted the words of the hymn, 'Where every prospect pleases, and only man is vile.' It is, of course, very difficult to say of another man's parishioners whether the adjective is justified; but in this particular case, I think, the parson was a disappointed idealist who had expected too much. For in some respects country people are a great deal more stubborn than the inhabitants of towns and are gifted with strong immunity against improvements. Traditions are very strong, and especially, perhaps, bad traditions; one should not expect to change them in a hurry.

In the country, people are good haters; their animosities are sometimes very bitter, and though they have been known to forgive, they never forget, injuries real or fancied. A grievance is

sometimes cherished as a man might cherish a family heirloom, from one generation to another. A typical instance of this is the case of a farmer in a village with which the writer is acquainted. A generation ago the landowner in a redistribution of some of the land took a field from the farm of this man's father and attached it to the farm of a man who happened then to hold the office of churchwarden. The despoiled farmer regarded this, by some strange process of logic, as the fault of the Church, and resolved never to attend church again—a promise he faithfully kept, save to attend the funerals of others and, at the last, his own. And now his son, a man of some fifty years of age, keeps up the tradition in the same way. He, alas, is childless, so it looks as if the feud must die out. One sympathizes with a case of this sort; for in the country it is very difficult to change one's mind. If it is publicly known (as it soon will be) that one has ceased to attend church, it would call for a heroism of which very few are capable to repent. Everyone would notice it, everyone would talk of it. It would be like embracing Christianity in the age of Nero.

Grievances between fellow-parishioners are quite as troublesome to a country clergyman as grievances against himself or the Church, and they are far more rife. One woman will not work with another, and when each is the head of a faction the situation is difficult. To remove these animosities would be a task impossible perhaps to an archangel, and is certainly so to a country clergyman. The women in question know one another too well, and have made up their minds about one another's origin, antecedents, character, habits, and temper long ago; this is why village vendettas are more implacable than the divisions in a town parish. The parties live at close quarters, and have got upon one another's nerves, like sisters living together at home who do not agree. It is true that the men are as irreconcilable as the women; but their hostilities are often conducted with more reserve, and resemble an armed and polite neutrality which waits patiently for an opportunity to do real damage and wastes no time in trivialities.

Speaking of parochial factions and strifes, a beneficed friend once said to the writer that there was this much to be said for them, that so long as one's parishioners were divided amongst

themselves they could not combine against their clergyman. It would not be safe, however, to presume on this too far. What must often have impressed the observant clergyman is a sudden re-alignment of forces. He departs, perhaps, for a holiday, and on his return notes, with silent interest, that women (or men) who were scarcely on speaking terms a month ago, are suddenly entered into one another's affections. It is a pretty safe principle to go upon that for purposes of mischief feuds can generally be pacified, at least for the time being. This is why is would be extremely hazardous, even if it were at all desirable, for the clergyman to identify himself with any faction. He must be equally polite to all, though he may respect some more than others. 'Love all, trust few, do wrong to none' is a serviceable maxim for the country parson.

Another disadvantage of the country clergyman's life is a certain degree of isolation. It may be that there is no other person of education in the parish; or that, if there be, their society is not congenial. And in many parts of the country those who share the parson's education, outlook, and social habits enjoy a much larger income than he does, which makes unrestrained and unembarrassed intercourse difficult. A great solvent of this isolation, which the parson naturally feels more keenly than his parishioners, is the motor-car; and it is noticeable that most country clergymen, whether they can afford to do so or not, contrive to maintain one of these vehicles, to enable them not only to get about their parishes, but (what is equally necessary) to get away from them. It should be remembered that protracted holidays, or even holidays at all, are rather a difficulty for the country clergyman, and all the more so since the town churches are themselves without curates and can offer no help. The ecclesiastical authorities should give to a country clergyman the chance from time to time to change his benefice. From seven to ten years is probably enough, apart from exceptional cases, for a man to spend in a country parish. Change is good for both him and his flock. Many men will not desire to take advantage of the opportunity to move; but there are many men, who perhaps have made mistakes which in the country it is extremely difficult to live down, for whom a change would be a new start in life.

This brings me to the last disadvantage of ministering to a country cure—the fewness of the people. The country parson cannot really afford to make an enemy of anyone, especially as he will meet them nearly every day on the road. And, in the country, the art of enmity is so well understood, and the practice of sowing tares among the wheat. In the town you may be unaware of hostility or indifferent to it, but in the country this is impossible. Every time you ascend the pulpit you see at a glance who is in the accustomed place and who is not. Each absentee leaves a noticeable gap, and a gap may be a protest, a defiance, or a reproof. Of course it may be necessary to make enemies, but one should make as few as possible. 'Of those whom thou gavest me I have lost none—save the son of perdition.' And sons of perdition are not common—even in the country. Although the parson who is afraid of offending anyone is despised, he who goes about seeking whom he may devour is hated. It is better to be reasonable, which is very different from being logical. Best of all is the charity which is not easily provoked, thinketh no evil; but suffereth long and is kind.

# BOOK REVIEWS

## THE TRUTH AND FASTING COMMUNION

Father H. Thurston, the Jesuit controversialist whose methods were recently dealt with by Dr. Coulton, has written a characterstically bitter attack, disfigured by personalities, on Dr. Dearmer's *The Truth about Fasting*.[1] Evidently the Roman Catholic authorities are becoming alarmed lest their flocks should discover that fasting communion, which they have been led to believe apostolic, is really a development of the Dark Ages. Communion after food is one of the mortal sins (classed with 'stealing a large sum of money,' in a now famous tract by the Society of St. Peter and St. Paul—more papal than the Pope); and a mortal sin involves endless burning in hell. The shallow statement drawn up by the Anglican bishops, after the first rejection of the Deposited Book, that fasting communion is an 'ancient and laudable' custom, seems to have given Roman Catholics just the support they needed in these trying times when the position of the Agapè before the Eucharist in the apostolic age is universally acknowledged. Fr. Thurston is therefore indignant that Dr. Dearmer should, as he supposes, have written his book to controvert the Anglican bishops. He is mistaken: as the author has since pointed out, *The Truth about Fasting* was published before the bishops made their pronouncement, though evidently they had not found time to read it.

[1] P. Dearmer, *The Truth about Fasting*. (Rivingtons, 1928. 3/6.)
H. Thurston, *The Eucharistic Fast*. (Longmans, 1928. 1/-.)

The argument of Dr. Dearmer's book is that in the first century the Communion was received after a meal and not before one; that the supposed evidences of the first five centuries are either forgeries or due to mistakes (as in the case of Pliny) which no scholar now defends. That the subsequent growth of the custom (largely due to the continual quotation of a sentence from Augustine, and the omission of the passage which explains his real meaning) was very slow; that it arose sporadically during the Dark Ages, and was finally fixed as a rigid law by Aquinas, *c.* 1270. Dr. Dearmer quoted in full every one of the so-called evidences that had been printed by the supporters of fasting communion, and dealt with them carefully.

Not a point in this position has been touched by Fr. Thurston. His method is to flourish extracts from the later Dark Ages, especially the ninth century, and to arrange them in such a disordered way that only a very careful student would be patient enough to put them side by side with Dr. Dearmer's extracts and compare them. Most of them had been already given in *The Truth about Fasting*; but Fr. Thurston has produced a few more instances from the ninth century, which we print below in order that all there is to be said, however irrelevant to the main issue, shall be before our readers.

## I. The Earlier Period.

Fr. Thurston deserves credit for having resisted any attempt to distort the Gospels or the Apostolic era, as so many of his predecessors in this path have done. Indeed, he passes the Early Church as a whole on one side, except for a half-hearted attempt to use Tertullian, when he misquotes Professor Burkitt's translation and attributes it to Dr. Dearmer. For the fourth century he is content yet once again to print the old extract from Augustine with no reference to the other passage (quoted in *The Truth about Fasting*, p. 124), which shows what Augustine really meant. He endeavours, however, to provide three new instances for the fifth and sixth centuries. (He can attribute the 'Eusebius' to the fourth if he likes.) These are:

1. A doubtful homily attributed by Zahn in 1884 to Eusebius, who died in 359. Whose it was does not matter, since it has nothing to do with fasting communion but belongs to those instances of the Lenten fast which are dealt with on pp. 34, 55-59, etc., of Dr. Dearmer's book. This fact is concealed by the interpolation in Fr. Thurston's text, without warning, of the words '(*i.e.* Easter)' after 'the Pasch,' when 'Pasch' really means the penitential fast of Easter *Even*.[2] The crucial sentence is:

> I know a number of people who even on the holy day of the Pasch have taken food and gone to sleep instead of fasting and watching as they should do on the Easter vigil, but nevertheless have afterwards received Communion. Woe to those who do the like![3]

They communicated, although they had broken the most solemn fast of the year. The writer, whoever he was, had no idea of fasting communion in his mind.

2. The case of Melania, a Roman lady who died near Jerusalem in 439.

> Of this holy ascetic we are told that she never took any bodily food unless she had first partaken in communion of the body of the

[2] Mentioned in *The Truth about Fasting*, pp. 55 56). The meaning of the word is explained by Dom. Connolly as there quoted.

[3] In each case the references are given as they are printed by Fr. Thurston. Th. Zahn, *Skizzen aus dem Leben des Alten Kisch*, p. 284.

> Lord, which she received more especially for the safeguard of her soul.[4]

Precisely; she was an ascetic, and her practice is quoted as one of the peculiar signs of her asceticism. If it had been the practice of others, it would not have been mentioned in her case. To quote her as an instance of 'the wide dissemination in the fifth cenutry' of fasting communion is like quoting the existence of a street that was called straight in Damascus as an evidence that Asiatic streets were usually without curvature. As it happens, we have a parallel instance in the case of the devout Lady Margaret, who in 1509 (when people communicated only once a year) was regarded as a marvel because she communicated 'fullnigh a dozen times a year.'

Melania, indeed, only proves that the notion of fasting communion as such had not yet arisen. She did not fast before communion; she fasted constantly, and only broke her fast on those days when she had communicated.

3. The exceedingly dubious character of Syrian canons and canonical answers is well known to Orientalists. 'Antedated, usually by several centuries,' is a euphemistic way of saying that someone sat down and composed a statement to which he affixed the name of a better-known man who had lived long before. We deal with such practices nowadays in the law-courts. Our Jesuit critic has found another, even less edifying than the example Dr. Dearmer quoted. It is attributed to John bar Cursus, or bar Cyriacus, Bishop of Tella, who 'is said to have died a martyr's death in A.D. 538.' We suggest the eighth century as a more probable date, or the ninth (which is the date of the earliest MS. according to Baumstark):

> *Question* 21. If blood from his nose gets into a man's mouth while sleeping, can he communicate?
>
> *Answer.* If this only happens once in a way he would do well to abstain, but if it occurs repeatedly, it would be hard to deprive him.[5]

The writer says in another answer that a man may drink water before communicating.[6] So after all he is a damaging witness for the Roman case.

Forgeries, however, have this value: they show what ideas were growing up in the minds of people in the ninth century or thereabouts, and we know that the scruple about blood existed at that period.

## II. The Seventh Century.

The attempt to drag in St. Cuthbert is characterstic. Fr. Thurston says in his conclusion:—

> 'How early the principle that the Mass should precede all taking of food established itself in the West, it is not quite easy to decide. The example of St. Cuthbert, quoted above, speaks reliably for A.D. 651.'

'The example of St. Cuthbert'! Here it is: A beggar asked for food at the Abbey of Ripon; and Cuthbert told him to wait in the guest-house until Terce, because he could not lawfully offer him food till then.[7] All we can gather from this story is that the monks at Ripon either did not dine or did not give food to strangers till about 9 a.m. (the usual hour for dinner), when Terce was said. And this is quoted as evidence for a general 'principle' of 'Mass before food'!

[4] Rampolla, *Santa Melania Giuniore Senatrice Romano*, cap. 62, p. 36.
[5] F. Nau, *Canons et Résolutions Canoniques*, p. 13.
[6] *Op. cit.*, p. 10.
[7] Quoted in *The Eucharistic Fast* from Bede, *Opera Minora*, II, p. 265.

Indeed, so hard pressed is Fr. Thurston for seventh-century evidence that he can only add to this a quotation from an *eighth* century life of St. Walaricus (who died in 622), where it is said that the saint reproved two workmen for drinking before Mass. 'Drinking' had a weighty meaning in those days, and we should agree with the saint in discouraging the habit of beginning so early in the morning.

### III. The Dark Ages.

Dr. Dearmer quoted in *The Truth about Fasting* such instances as had been published of the first local beginnings in the seventh to the ninth centuries of the ideas which ultimately led to the definite thirteenth century rule of fasting communion. Fr. Thurston does not produce anything more till the ninth century. Here he has a quotation from Pope Nicholas I and four instances of the copying or paraphrasing of the so-often-quoted extract from Augustine. Of these we need say nothing (instances of this uncritical quotation are given on pp. 83, 83, note 2, 93 and 99 of Dr. Dearmer's book), except to say that they are from (1) Pseudo-Bede, (2) Sedulius Scotus, (3) Haymo of Halberstadt, and (4) Paschasius Radbertus, and are produced as belonging to the ninth century.

5. From the *ninth century* one extract is produced of which Fr. Thurston is able to say, not perhaps without an air of relief, that its 'authority' 'has never been contested.' It is another instance of blood flowing, and is from Pope Nicholas I, who in 866 gave answers to questions by Boris, the nearly-converted barbarian King of the Bulgarians. In spite of the curious comparison he makes with medical practice, Nicholas was in his way an able man; but it was indeed a dark age; and the year before Nicholas had given the first papal recognition to the False Decretals. His contribution to our subject is as follows:—

> Every day we find physicians who require that their remedies should be taken upon an empty stomach; and if this is done for the sake of bodily health, how much more should this care be observed for the salvation of our souls. However, there is no rule which prescribes that because a man's nose bleeds, or there has been blood coming from his mouth, he should on that account be debarred from receiving the body and blood of Christ.[8]

We are almost ashamed to quote such miserable things; but this from Pope Nicholas is Fr. Thurston's great argument. He wrote a letter to the *Guardian* for September 28th, 1928, in which he actually said:—

> 'If Pope Nicholas I before A.D. 867 wrote what we find in Sections 60 and 65 of his letter to the Bulgarians, a document the authenticity of which has never been disputed, the greater part of Dr. Dearmer's whole contention at once falls to the ground.'

Yet Dr. Dearmer had already quoted a forgery in the False Decretals which Nicholas gave to the world, the forgery where fasting communion is attributed to Pope Soter in the second century. Clearly the idea was already abroad, or a forged statement would not have been made to support it. But the amusing thing is that Nicholas fulminated aaginst breakfast not only before communion, but at any time (as Dr. Dearmer pointed out in the next issue of the *Guardian*). Not content with being a no-breakfaster, he said that there was a curse on breakfasting on any day or at any time of the year, because 'we read that a woe is denounced against those that eat in the morning.' Nicholas' reference is to *Isaiah* v, 11 (and cf. *Ecclesiastes* x, 16-18), where the prophet says, 'Woe unto them that

[8] Migne, P. L., Vol. CXIX, c. 1004.

rise up early in the morning *that they may follow strong drink.*' A delicious argument!

6. Superstition has deepened. But for the *tenth century,* Fr. Thurston can find nothing more except an instance from Regino, Abbot of Prüm (*f.* 951), who asked :—

> Whether the priest, which God forbid, presume to say Mass after taking either food or drink.[9]

This is a reference to the priest only; and Dr. Dearmer had already given earlier instances of the growth of the custom among the clergy in Chapter xiii of *The Truth about Fasting.*

7. For the *eleventh century,* Fr. Thurston gives three more examples to add to those which Dr. Dearmer had printed.[10] One, from a German penitential (and there are some others), shows in an instructive way the degeneration of what were once broad principles into cruel and superstitious rules, which included the flogging of children :—

> Hast thou received the body and blood of Christ after swallowing anything, even if it were only very small? If thou hast done so, even though it were but once and that only in thy childhood, unless it was done by way of viaticum, thou art bound to fast for ten days on bread and water.[11]

8. The second, from the dubious collection under the name of Burchard, Bishop of Worms, is of interest because it shows that even as late as the eleventh century 'food' still meant a meal, and that by this time the idea of fasting has been extended, as least by some, to include any refreshment. He says :—

> Anyone who received the Eucharist after taking food, or even any small refreshment, must do penance—a child for three days, an adult for seven, a cleric for twenty.

Fr. Thurston says that though this is 'a collection of decrees, many of them apocryphal, it nevertheless is evidence for the eleventh century.' He is right; and it is a lamentable fact that, whereas one can believe pagan classical authors as men who endeavoured to tell the truth, no one can trust the monastic writers of these ages in the simplest matters of fact.

9. The last instance before the thirteenth century is that of Abbot Aelfric in the eleventh. He merely carries on the rules of Auxerre and of Theodore, which are quoted on pp. 87 and 90 of *The Truth about Fasting.* He refers to the deacon and sub-deacon in a monastery, and says :—

> He that tastes anything, either food or drink, oysters or fruit, wine or water, must not read the epistle or the gospel at Mass. If he does either of these things he dishonoureth God, and by such audacity he bringeth himself to destruction.[12]

Here we have an attempt to make a rule, not of fasting communion, but of fasting ministration; and it was an attempt that failed. St. Hugh of Lincoln, however, at the end of the twelfth century showed more intelligence in dealing with a similar monkish prejudice: he insisted that the assistant ministers should take some refreshment, and told them they were lacking both in faith and common sense. This, for lack of better evidence, is quoted by Fr. Thurston as if it weakened Dr. Dearmer's proved conten-

[9] Migne, P. L., Vol. CXXXII, c. 188, n. 30.

[10] 'We may therefore assume that the principle was accepted in some places by the middle of the eleventh century, if not earlier, though its application had not yet been defined.'—*The Truth about Fasting,* p. 97.

[11] Schmitz, *Die Bussbücher und das Kanonische Bussverfahren,* Vol. II, p. 440.

[12] B. Fehr, *Die Hirtenbriefe Aelfrics,* pp. 183, 65.

tion that fasting communion did not grow up till the time when the remains of European civilization had been engulfed by the barbarian invasions.

We apologise to our readers! But, as Dr. Dearmer has pointed out, the personal abuse in Fr. Thurston's pamphlet has gone the round of the Roman Catholic press—and of the *Church Times*. It was therefore worth while to deal with it in some completeness.

Dr. Dearmer claimed that fasting communion grew up slowly and later than Augustine, being in fact a product of the Dark Ages, and that it gradually, as time passed on, became a rule. Fr. Thurston admits exactly the same thing in the passage we have quoted above: '*How early the principle that the Mass should precede all taking of food established itself in the West, it is not quite easy to decide.* The example of St. Cuthbert . . . speaks reliably for A.D. 651.'

And we have shown that neither Cuthbert nor Walaricus prove anything for the seventh century.

Fr. Thurston is thus driven to claim as his *pièce de résistance* Nicholas I, but this is in the *ninth* century. When the fog is cleared away, we thus find his pamphlet admitting Dr. Dearmer's contention. Fasting communion and the False Decretals can both with certainty be found in the pontificate of Nicholas I.

## WOMEN AS PRIESTS.*

Canon Raven's analysis of the present position inside and outside the Church of England displays real insight. When, in *Women and Holy Orders*, he calls the revolution in the position of women, due to the higher education of women in the present day, 'by far the most critical element in the whole of the present situation,' he is only speaking what is sober fact. All other movements affect mere aspects of human life, but what affects woman has both in herself and through her child a profounder influence upon mankind.

But the revolution in women's position and work which has affected every other sphere of life has left the Church practically unchanged. It is true that at the last Lambeth Conference the assembled bishops of the Anglican Communion professed themselves to be inspired by the Holy Ghost to permit women to address congregations of women and children only, in church at other than the regular services. But even this moderate reform aroused the opposition of the advanced Anglo-Catholic party, which obtained the signatures of thousands of 'devout and honourable women' who obviously disapproved of the promptings of the Holy Ghost. Whereupon the bishops were expected to prefer the promptings of the Anglo-Catholic party, as indicating a safer and more peaceable policy.

Outside the Church, however, a competent woman to-day can find excellent audiences, by no means confined to 'women and children,' on almost any subject on which she chooses to speak. She sits in Parliament, addresses electorates, is voted on to Borough Councils and Boards of Guardians, conducts cases in Courts of Justice, as barrister or Justice of the Peace, she directs the education of millions of the rising generation, has the supreme command in large institutions affecting the welfare of old and young of both sexes, and is everywhere becoming more and more recognized as capable of filling the most important and responsible positions with dignity and efficiency.

**Women and Holy Orders.* By C. E. Raven, D.D. (Hodder and Stoughton. Price 2/6 net. 1928.)

It may be asked, what more do women want? Very little, it is true, and increasingly less as more and more openings appear before them, and as organized religion of any kind continues to lose its attraction for the laity as a whole.

But a certain modicum of women, as of men, who cherish a deep sense of religious vocation, still desire to offer their whole lives to the full-time service of the Christian Church. What is the position of a woman qualified to serve in Parliament who prefers to offer her gifts and time to the service of the English Church?

Canon Raven answers the question thus: 'Officially their status is that of total inferiority; and it is at least doubtful whether any woman of ability is justified in accepting conditions which deny to her the power to use her gifts to the full. She will have to work all her life under a system which assigns to her less opportunity than to the most illiterate curate.—They realize that the Church does not want them except on terms which make fullness of service impossible. They must employ their talents, not bury them.—There are diversities of gifts among women as among men; but at present the Church allows scope to women on the assumption that they are incapable of leadership, of preaching, of any equality with men or any freedom to exercise special qualities.—We have had constant complaints and innumerable reports bewailing the dearth of (men) candidates; the Women's Movement has developed a large number of women fully qualified for the ministry; the Church needs their gifts; it ought not to meet their offers with a system framed under the old *régime*, but should admit them, when qualified and trained, to ordination.'

This is Canon Raven's thesis. He proceeds to amplify it by describing the need for fully-ordained women to minister to the spiritual needs of their own sex in a matter in which they have too long been compelled, often sorely against their own sense of fitness, to suffer the ministrations of men. There come times in the lives of many, if not most, men and women when a strong need is felt for the direction, sympathy, and spiritual help and advice, of some friend whom they could thoroughly respect and trust. In the Churches which have inherited most strongly the traditions of the past, the Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox, this spiritual counsellor is a compulsory institution and invariably an ordained priest. Hence women have no choice and are enjoined to lay bare the most sacred and intimate concerns of their soul's life to a member of the opposite sex. It is this, in part, which led to the reaction against the practice of compulsory confession at the time of the Reformation. After the Reformation the English Church continued to recognize the value of the institution of sacramental confession for certain temperaments and certain crises of life, though it abolished its compulsory character. Granted that the need is a real one, and that the Church exists to satisfy it, imagine the positions reversed and what would have been said if in the case of boys and men, often at the most emotional crises of their lives, the sole ministrant appointed by the Church to which they might turn, was invariably a woman? One can easily conceive the outcry against such a hardship and wrong. Is it not then a great hardship and wrong to expect women and girls to turn for help in spiritual crises to one of the opposite sex and to one, who, in the circumstances, must be impersonal, 'an ear and a voice'? In spiritual crises it is spiritual friendship that is required, and if men are normally unable to offer such friendship to women without danger to either side, surely here is a case where the sexes should as a rule properly minister only to their own? Of course, to those who do not believe that any spiritual gift is given by the sacrament of absolution, and that a lay friend is of equal value with an ordained priest, such a case can make

little appeal; but Canon Raven is addressing those whose belief in the Church's sacraments, and in particular in the grace conferred by ordination, is profound.

Let Canon Raven himself speak once more in this connexion. 'The risks of unpleasantness, of morbidity, and even of moral disaster are too serious to be passed over in silence . . . In our own Church most of us are only too well acquainted with cases in which both priest and penitent have been morally injured, cases of men whose minds are diseased and of women whose feelings have been outraged.'

The reviewer can vouch for the tragic truth of this from personal knowledge; she is of opinion that in the confessional a grievous wrong has been inflicted on women for many centuries, but that the Church had hold empirically of a real truth, and that the Protestant wholesale reaction against confession abolished a great means of soul-cure which is being re-discovered to-day by psycho-analysis and scientific psychology. But the true solution for the Church where women are concerned has never yet been adequately faced, and Canon Raven's conclusion on this matter seems entirely sound.

'Men and women can advise and assist one another in multitudes of ways: the delicate business of the cure of souls is not, I think, one in which people should normally minister to the opposite sex. And if anyone asks, "What about doctors?" I would urge that the parallel is not exact; for in the priest's case love is the chief means of effecting a cure.

'Hence, for those who believe in the value of a sacramental ministry with the priestly function of helping the tempted, the case for a body of women duly trained and ordained seems overwhelmingly strong. Such work should be done under authority from the Church: it cannot be properly done except by women: they should be commissioned for it.'

Further, Canon Raven points out that in all progress within the Church it is the Spirit's call which has come first, and the Church has followed by developing an appropriate means by which that call may find expression. It was so in the case of Cornelius and the admission of Gentile Christians in the early Church upon equal terms with Jews. How revolutionary this suggestion seemed at the time is proved by the whole history of St. Paul's persecutions at the hands of Judaizing Christians. The admission of the Gentiles was the rock upon which the narrow Jerusalem Church split. The admission of women to the priesthood upon equal terms with men is not more revolutionary to-day. St. Paul himself classed sex and race equality together. 'In Christ is neither male nor female, Jew nor Gentile, bond nor free.' The two latter pairs of statements have long since been accepted. The most fundamental of all has had to wait almost two thousand years before it could even be suggested. Is it the less true?

Women are receiving the call of God to use their gifts to-day in ever-increasing numbers. The Church of God is now practically the only place where a sex disqualification still exists.

In another interesting passage Canon Raven points out that adaptation is the law of survival. No one will deny that the Church has for two thousand years been largely supported, served, and endowed by its women members. If these, or the best among them, are lost to its cause, can it fail to suffer? Is not the decay of institutional religion to-day largely due to the lack of interest in it taken by the best and most intelligent women? Is not this lack of interest directly due to the recognition that here they have no adequate part to play; in other words, that here alone their best is not required? The conclusion such women tend to arrive at is that institutional and sacramental religion are altogether vastly exaggerated in importance and can be very well done without.

If the Church does not value the new womanhood in its ministry, it is perfectly certain that the Church will lose it from its membership. It is high time then that the Church should take its stand in the van instead of in the rear of human progress and bravely lead the new womanhood, as well as manhood, into the measure of the fulness of the stature of Christ.

MARJORY S. WEST.

## CATHOLICISM ARRAIGNED.*

It cannot be denied that within the last thirty years the movement known as Anglo-Catholicism has done much to transform the outward appearance of the Church of England and, though to a less extent, the doctrine taught inside her borders. The fact is symptomatic. The religious attitude of the English people remains in all essentials what it has been since the Reformation—conservative, not very thoughtful, and dominated by a dislike and a political fear of the Pope. The same is hardly true of that section of our people which takes a more or less active part in the life of organized Christianity; a distinct change is here observable. It may be that acceptance of Catholicism as a coherent religious life is but little more common than it has hitherto been; but there is an undoubted readiness to look with favour upon much that is characteristic of Catholicism considered as a body of dogma and a mode of worship. This is combined with, and encouraged by, a feeling that traditional Protestantism has lost its life and savour. The reason is obvious. Traditional Protestantism tended to base itself on the Bible only, and the Bible interpreted in a way which Biblical criticism has finally invalidated. Nor can there be any doubt that in the minds of all but some theologians and critics the Catholic part of organized Christianity *seems* to have been less affected by Biblical criticism than Protestantism. 'Protestant' is a title for which men have died, but it is one for which nowadays fewer and fewer care to contend. 'Catholic writers frequently seem inclined to construe the tribute now frequently paid to Catholicism by Protestants as a tacit admission on the part of the latter that the position they hold is on the whole the weaker position.' Dr. Cadoux has produced a book of about 700 pages to prove that it is nothing of the sort. He names his work 'A Vindication of Progressive Protestantism.'

Dr. Cadoux is a Free-Churchman, and his readers will hardly fail to notice how utterly different is his work from that characteristic of earlier Protestant attacks on Catholicism which, indeed, often assisted that which they sought to destroy. He is fully appreciative of the merits and advantages of Catholicism, and never loses his temper. In reading his book one is again and again conscious that here is a healthy and sane contention for those principles which forbid the acceptance of Roman Catholic claims, such as is too seldom forthcoming from Anglicans who, equally with Dr. Cadoux, reject those claims. The structure of Catholicism is examined step by step, and if the book contains little that is new it is nevertheless extremely valuable in that it amasses a corpus of argument which is often discredited less because it is faulty than because, in isolation from first principles, it is incomplete.

Dr. Cadoux presents his case for Protestantism as against Catholicism in five sections. The first states what Catholicism is, how it regards other forms of Christianity, and what are its advantages and attractions. Part II contains his answer to the most basic issue involved in the Roman

**Catholicism and Christianity.* By Cecil John Cadoux, M.A., D.D. (London). (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. Price 21/-. 1928.)

claim, that of authority; Part III answers the Roman claim on the basis of history, and Part IV does the same on the basis of morality. Dr. Cadoux does not quarrel with the Roman position that ratiocination is not the sufficient means to the attainment of religious truth. His position is that whatever truth is attained by reason is revealed, though reason may not exhaust all that is revealed. He would incur the anathema of Rome for holding that the existence of God is not demonstrable by human reason. The error of Catholicism is not in denying the absolute validity of reason, but in checking the activities of reason before they reach their limit. Dogma is not confined to the recognition of elemental and supra-rational verities, but includes a host of concrete propositions relating to questions of ecclesiastical and literary history, to physical science, and to philosophical theology. The familiar difficulty attaching to the Infallibility Decree—that is, whether it is to receive a maximistic or a minimistic interpretation, is fully examined, and the inevitable *practical* conclusion is stated thus :—

> 'The supposed uncertainty about *ex cathedra* and infallible utterances, whatever be the theoretical truth in regard to it, furnishes the Catholic with no liberty at all, either logical, legal, or practical, to express any dissent from any authoritative statement officially issued by the Holy See . . . All Catholics must obey the Pope, whether he be infallible or not' (p. 35).

It is indeed obvious that Rome attempts to limit reason by other limitations than those reason herself creates, and thus implicitly denies the divine origin of reason in which the Vatican decrees explicitly assert belief. The issue could not be more clearly stated than it is on p. 100 :—

> 'Those who are deaf to the voice or blind to the presence of reason when she is operating within the ring-fence of dogma, cannot really compensate for this disrespect by lavish professions of trust in her when she is outside it, seeing that her credentials and her methods are the same in the one case as in the other.'

The familiar and, to a certain type of mind, forceful plea that if God has vouchsafed any revelation at all He must also have provided for its infallible preservation and interpretation, finds its sufficient answer in the following words :—

> 'Not only is the theory that there *must* be somewhere an infallible guide, at best a plausible assumption void of logical cogency, but every analogy drawn from God's *known methods* of providing for us in other ways tends to show that, plausible or not, it is inherently unlikely to be true' (p. 108).

Dr. Cadoux proceeds to demonstrate the ultimacy of the Inner Light, by which he does not mean some peculiar faculty of man by which he immediately apprehends divine truth, but 'the whole of those internal powers and endowments which enable the individual to appropriate Divine Reality.'

Of infallibilities there is none. The recognition of this truth does not lead Dr. Cadoux to deny a real authority to a genuinely free corporate Christian consciousness; similarly he refutes the common assertion that belief in Christ's divinity and trust in his authority is impossible if his intellectual infallibility be denied :—

> 'Jesus is a unique objective moral authority because, by evoking a unique response from our deepest selves, He reveals Himself as the human image of the Invisible God.'

The Credal test of membership in the Christian Church is often defended on grounds such as that Creeds guard the essentials of belief which are necessary both to salvation and to the maintenance of the Church as a definite society; that it has been so from New Testament days, and that Creeds embody the decisions of the *whole* Church. Dr. Cadoux examines these contentions and concludes that the acceptance of the historic Creeds was secured by coercion, that they exalt the metaphysical above the moral, and make considerable additions to the original simple profession of faith in Christ. He is not averse to Creeds as such, nor does he suppose that the Church ought not to have authoritative statements of her faith, but that is not the same thing as making these Creeds tests of membership in the company of the disciples of Christ. No Creed has that measure of infallibility which can justify the exclusion from the Church of one who cannot accept it, for

> 'just as it is better for the guilty to escape than for the innocent to suffer capital punishment, so it is better for the errorist to be admitted into the Church than for the Lord's disciple to be excluded.'

He might have added that Credal tests of Church membership are futile; they can and do exclude the thoughtful and the sincere, whereas they can never exclude the stupid and the mentally slack or dishonest. For Dr. Cadoux the position of the progressive Protestant is not

> 'The Bible only and not the Creed; it is rather: neither Bible nor Creed as infallible and ultimate, but both Bible and Creed and all other true and inspired writings as sources to be learnt from by the light of God's Spirit within us.'

Part V, which deals with the future of the Christian Church, Reunion and lines of advance in the future, contains much useful criticism and constructive suggestion. Further, the copious footnotes and book references constitute an excellent bibliography of the whole range of subjects treated in the text. We think that the value of the book would have been even greater than it is had the author distinguished more clearly between Roman and Anglican Catholicism. We do not suggest that he is unaware of the differences, but rather that he is inclined to minimize them. Thus:—

> 'The fact that it (the Anglo-Catholic School) is committed to no belief in papal infallibility or other *recently* promulgated dogmas enables Anglicanism to present a less difficult version of history than Catholicism can; but whether there corresponds to this advantage any gain in ultimate logical consistency may well be doubted.'

This and other passages in Dr. Cadoux' book seem to us to attach too little importance to the fundamental difference between Romanism and Anglicanism. Doubtless there are among us those whose attitude to Rome is hardly consistent with ecclesiastical separation from her; but that is hardly true of those liberal Anglo-Catholic writers from whom Dr. Cadoux cites so many quotations. They are really separated from Rome by as fundamental a divergence as Dr. Cadoux himself. For the essence of Roman Catholicism consists not in sacramentalism, theories of ecclesiastical history, or a catena of irreformable dogmas; on all these matters there is a close resemblance between statements in the works of our Liberal Anglo-Catholics and Romanism. But on the fundamental characteristic of Catholicism—the control of the individual conscience by other men who act in the name of heaven—the difference between these scholars and Romanism is absolute. To whatever criticisms their version of Catholicism is open, unless this impassable gulf is kept in view, the focus of one's

vision is improperly adjusted, and criticisms of 'the Catholic standpoint' do not necessarily apply to both equally. We are not suggesting that Dr. Cadoux is at all unaware of the difference, but it would have conduced to greater clarity and effectiveness if he had dealt separately with Romanism and then with kindred presentations of Christianity.

It must not be thought that the Protestantism which Dr. Cadoux attempts to vindicate is a mere series of negations of Catholic doctrines. It is, in reality, Modernism. His own statement of it deserves to be quoted in full :—

> 'Let it here be said that the Protestantism we defend, so far from being a negative thing, is—by the very fact that it is unencumbered by an erroneous philosophy—capable of conveying far fuller and more positive truth than Catholicism can find room for. It builds, in happy confidence, on the presence of the Divine Spirit in man, and on the native kinship between the human mind and Divine truth, between the human heart and Divine righteousness. It finds "new light and truth breaking forth" from all quarters of human experience and discovery; it does not deserve the reproach, mistakenly brought against it, of refusing to be taught by the wise of old: it is content to adapt itself deliberately and knowingly to those limitations and conditions of progressive knowledge which God has ordained. It distils the words of God from the pages of Scripture, without needing at every point to take refuge from glaring improbabilities by shutting its eyes to them: it looks to Jesus as the unique and abiding revelation of the Father, knowing that "God was in Christ, reconciling the world to Himself," and it reposes its trust in Him as Saviour and Guide. Finally, it treasures the heritage of the Christian Church, revering her story, her message and her thoughts, endeavouring to learn wisdom from the record of her varied experience, and to copy the examples of her most conspicuous leaders of earlier times by fearlessly looking at all the varied phases of truth within reach, and believing that the guidance of God is never lacking to those who bring diligence and honesty and reverence to the study of His ways.'

J.S.B.

## THE LATEST ONE-VOLUME COMMENTARY.*

*The New Commentary* on Holy Scripture, including the Apocrypha, edited by Bishop Gore, Canon Goudge and Professor Guillaume, in a single volume, is a notable achievement. This is the third single-volume Biblical commentary of recent years, and we think it just to add that, as Peake's marked an advance on Dummelow's, so this marks an advance on Peake's. It is beautifully printed and has a most attractive *format* and binding. Its price is extraordinarily low, so that it is within the purchasing power of the poorest of the clergy, and in no conventional way we feel justified in saying that it is a book that every clergyman should purchase. To attempt any detailed description or criticism of its contents is impossible within the limits of this notice. As a commentary it is marked by a spirit of constructive criticism. It is eminently judicious and, where it can, without being egregious, decides for the conservative position. There are cases where this conservative tendency is carried much too far: for example, when Dr. Burn and Professor Goudge say of the Pastoral Epistles, 'There is nothing definitely to prove that he [St. Paul] did not write them as we

**A New Commentary on Holy Scripture, including the Apocrypha.* Edited by Charles Gore, Henry Leighton Goudge and Alfred Guillaume. (S.P.C.K. Price 16/- net. 1928.)

have them to-day.' We ought to add that the commentators, while ready to claim that St. Paul had his share in their production, do not claim that the Pastorals in their entirety are the work of St. Paul.

Another tendency sometimes apparent in the commentary is the endeavour to be more 'Catholic' than is properly admissible. Dr. McNeile comments as follows on Psalm LI. v. 14 :—

> 'He does not ask to be kept from bloodshed : the guilt of it was lying upon him, and he asks to be released from it—which is what divine absolution does. The guilt of blood may stand for the Christian, for the guilt of any mortal sin that is fatal in its nature, to himself if not to another.'
>
> v. 18, 19 : 'The Christian can use the words with the thought that when the heart has been "built up" after penitence, God will be pleased with sacramental offerings.'

The volume contains essays of outstanding merit and interest; conspicuous among these is 'The Prophets of Israel' by Professor Burkitt, 'A Comparative Study of the Old Testament in the Light of Recent Anthropological and Archaeological Research' by Dr. E. O. James 'Environment social, political, intellectual and religious of Israel from Maccabees to our Lord' by Dr. Edwyn Bevan, and 'The Religious Background of the New Testament in Jewish Thought' by Dr. W. O. E. Oesterley.

Of the commentaries in the New Testament, that by Professor Turner on St. Mark is of greatest interest. He regards the Second Gospel as possessing supreme historic value.

> 'It is the unique record, objectively stated, of the experience of an eye-witness, an intimate companion of Jesus throughout His Ministry. And is it, then, paradoxical to say that historically it is the most important work ever written?'

Professor Turner regards the feeding of the 4,000 as a doublet of the feeding of the 5,000 and so unhistorical. The rest of the Gospel he regards as fact. He holds that the Gospel is defective in its termination with the words 'For they were afraid' (xvi, 8). He writes :—

> 'Something therefore is wanting, though we cannot tell whether the defect is due to unforeseen circumstances which prevented the lost ending from being ever written at all, or (as seems much more likely) to the accidental destruction of the last bit of papyrus roll which once contained it.'

On the whole, Professor Turner's commentary is characterised by erudition rather than by originality, by judicious conservatism rather than by daring criticism. He is our English Zahn. This is as it should be for the purpose for which the commentary is intended. A similar conservatism is apparent in the commentary on St. Matthew by Dr. Levertoff and Canon Goudge. The 'Thou art Peter' passage, it is argued, is a genuine utterance of our Lord. Yet, on the other hand, the commentators remark on Pilate's setting a guard over the sepulchre, and the incidents in xxviii, 2-4, 11-15, that they 'all are more than questionable.' Dr. Lock's commentary on the Fourth Gospel abounds in valuable exposition, but he avoids as far as possible the problem of historicity. Another feature of the volume is a series of apologetic essays on 'The New Testament and the Catholic Creeds,' 'The Constitution of the Church in the New Testament,' 'Sacraments in the New Testament,' 'The Virgin Birth of Our Lord,' 'The Evidence of the Resurrection.' Where in some cases strict loyalty to the Catholic Faith prescribes for the essayists the con-

clusions they are required to reach, their contributions are of less interest to the critical reader than other sections of this excellent volume. After writing many ingenious and some things hard to be reconciled in his essay on The Evidence of the Resurrection,' Canon Selwyn concludes with these words :—

> 'The claim of faith is that the Lord passed at the resurrection into a new and more glorious mode of being involving every essential element of His manhood. And so far as historical evidence can certify such a fact, we may say that the testimony of the writers of the New Testament is clear, convincing and sufficient.'

Modernists would accept that. We hope that Traditionalists will regard it as sufficient.

In looking up the Select Subjects Index in our volume we failed to find any reference to Zoroastrianism. The Biblical commentators of the future will have to pay much more attention to the influence of Zoroastrianism on Exilic and Post-Exilic Judaism and Primitive Christianity than is the practice to-day among our exegetes.

H.D.A.M.

## BIBLICAL BOOKS.*

*The Friend of Little Children*, the story of Our Lord's life told for children, is related with great liveliness and sympathy by Mr. Sinclair Stevenson. He makes large use of all the four Gospels and presents their narratives as historically true in all respects. Probably this is the best way to begin. When, however, questions are asked we must be prepared to answer them with candour. The book is excellently printed and charmingly illustrated, and consists of some 400 pages—a wonderful volume for the price.

Somewhat larger, consisting of over 500 pages in double columns, very well printed in good type, and with a number of excellent illustrations, is *The Children's Bible*—the words of the Old and New Testaments arranged, illustrated and explained for young people. The selection of passages is very well made. The explanations are few and to the point. Many parents will prefer this volume, edited by Mr. John Stirling, because it gives the actual words of Scripture. We think it possible, however, that the children may prefer Mr. Sinclair Stevenson's method.

*The Cambridge Shorter Bible*, arranged by Professor Nairne, Dr. Glover and Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch, is a choice production of the Cambridge University Press. It is a sequel to *The Little Children's Bible* and *The Children's Bible*. Sound judgment has been exhibited in the passages excised. The text is mainly that of the Authorised Version. The editors have themselves ventured upon a few slight alterations. We wish they had increased them, *e.g.* they might have distinguished effectively between the *min* partitive and the *min* privative in the blessings of Jacob and Esau. They have happily included the Apocrypha. The Scriptures are printed in paragraphs, chapter and verse being excluded. It is a most desirable volume and consists of nearly 900 pages. H.D.A.M.

**The Friend of Little Children.* By J. Sinclair Stevenson, M.A., B.D. New and Revised Edition. (Basil Blackwell. Oxford. Price 7/6 net. 1928.)
**The Child's Bible.* Edited by John Stirling. (Cassells. Price 10/6 net. 1928.)
**The Cambridge Shorter Bible.* (Cambridge University Press. Price 7/6 net. 1928.)

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[The Editor greatly regrets that owing to extreme pressure on space, he has been compelled to hold over all correspondence to the next issue.]